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ABSTRACT 
This thesis constitutes a survey of the cost growth of the weapon systems acquired 
by the U.S. DoD Services. It attempts to assess whether the extensive consolidation of the 
defense industry has led to any significant reduction of the cost growth. The primary data 
source for the cost of the weapon systems are the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), 
which are published by the DoD for the major acquisition programs. The time period 
explored is approximately from 1985 until 2007.  
An overall assessment of the situation of the defense industry today, because of 
the consolidation, will be made. The ultimate goal of the project is to attempt to reveal if 
the consolidation has improved efficiency, in terms of the cost growth, thus being 
beneficial for the DoD, or if further restructuring of the acquisition system is necessary as 
a response to the new conditions. 
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B.  OBJECTIVE OF STUDY ...............................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................3 
1. Primary Questions ...............................................................................3 
2. Secondary Questions............................................................................3 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................3 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ......................................................................4 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW.....................5 
A. THE COURSE TO THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
CONSOLIDATION .........................................................................................5 
1. Introduction..........................................................................................5 
2. U.S. Defense Procurement Expenditures...........................................5 
B. MERGERS AND MERGER WAVES.........................................................20 
1. Introduction........................................................................................20 
2. Terms and Definitions .......................................................................21 
3. Motives for Mergers ..........................................................................22 
4. Merger Waves in the History of U.S. Industry ...............................24 
a. First Merger Wave (1897 – 1904)...........................................26 
b. Second Merger Wave (1916 – 1929).......................................29 
c. Third Merger Wave (1965 – 1969) .........................................30 
d. Fourth Merger Wave (1984-1989) .........................................32 
e. Fifth Merger Wave (1992-2000).............................................35 
C. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY....................39 
1. Introduction........................................................................................39 
2. Legislation and Antitrust Issues .......................................................39 
a. The Basic Elements of the Antitrust Legal Framework........39 
b. Sherman Act (1890) ................................................................40 
c. Clayton Act– Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)............41 
d. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ............................................................42 
e. Horizontal Merger Guidelines................................................43 
f. The Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI) ...........................44 
3. What Did Really Happen After All? ................................................45 
4. The Role of DOD in the Consolidation of Defense Industry..........46 
a. Introduction.............................................................................46 
b. Restructuring Costs and Savings Issues ................................47 
c. Mergers and Acquisitions Proposals Reviews........................48 
d. Some Conclusions ...................................................................51 
D. TOP FIVE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONTRACTORS .....................52 
1. The Boeing Company ........................................................................57 
2. Lockheed Martin................................................................................58 
viii 
3. Northrop Grumman ..........................................................................59 
4. General Dynamics..............................................................................60 
5. Raytheon .............................................................................................61 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................67 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................67 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES.........................................................67 
C. COST GROWTH CALCULATIONS..........................................................69 
D. DATA ANALYSIS .........................................................................................71 
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ........................................................73 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................73 
B. RESULTS AND FINDINGS .........................................................................73 
1. All Programs.......................................................................................73 
2. Programs Before Consolidation (prior 1993) ..................................75 
3. Programs Including Consolidation Period (between 1993 and 
1997) ....................................................................................................76 
4. Programs After Consolidation Period (after 1997).........................78 
5. Analysis by NAICS ............................................................................83 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................87 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................87 
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................87 
1. Primary Research Question..............................................................87 
2. Secondary Research Questions.........................................................89 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.............................91 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................93 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................101 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. U.S. Defense Procurement 1941-2009 (After) ..................................................8 
Figure 2. U.S. Defense Procurement 1950-2009 (After) ..................................................9 
Figure 3. R&D Expenditures 1950-2009 (After) ............................................................11 
Figure 4. Defense Procurement and R&D 1950-2009 (After) ........................................12 
Figure 5. Defense Procurement Spending Ratio 1942-2009 [Year(n)/Year(n-1)] 
(After) ..............................................................................................................17 
Figure 6. U.S. Weapon Systems Exports 1989-1999 (After)..........................................18 
Figure 7. Ratio of U.S. Exports/U.S. Procurement (After) .............................................19 
Figure 8. Sum of U.S. Procurement Spending and Exports (1989-1999)(After)............20 
Figure 9. Number of Mergers in the United States, 1895 to 1990 (From)......................25 
Figure 10. Mergers & Average P/E Ratio (From ) ............................................................26 
Figure 11. Mergers of the First Wave 1895-1904 (After ) ................................................28 
Figure 12. Number of Mergers 1963-1980(After) ............................................................31 
Figure 13. Top Ten Deals Worldwide(From) ...................................................................37 
Figure 14. Top Ten Deals Worldwide(From) ...................................................................38 
Figure 15. Distribution of Prime Contracts Awards (After) .............................................56 
Figure 16. Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Boeing (After) .........................57 
Figure 17. Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Lockheed Martin(After) ..........58 
Figure 18. Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Northrop Grumman(After) ......59 
Figure 19. Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to General Dynamics(After) ........60 
Figure 20. Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Raytheon(After).......................61 
Figure 21. The Boeing Company Consolidation Diagram(From) ....................................62 
Figure 22. Lockheed Martin Corp. Consolidation Diagram(From) ..................................63 
Figure 23. General Dynamics Corp. Consolidation Diagram(From)................................64 
Figure 24. Northrop Grumman Corp. Consolidation Diagram (From).............................65 
Figure 25. Raytheon Company Consolidation Diagram (From).......................................66 
Figure 26. Distribution of examined systems Cost Growth (All Selected Programs) ......74 
Figure 27. Distribution of Cost Growths for systems before consolidation......................76 
Figure 28. Distribution of Cost Growths for Systems during Consolidation....................78 
Figure 29. Distribution of Cost Growths for Systems After Consolidation......................80 
Figure 30. Comparative Distribution of Cost Growths .....................................................82 
 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. World War II (After)........................................................................................13 
Table 2. Korean War (After)..........................................................................................14 
Table 3. Vietnam War(After).........................................................................................14 
Table 4. Cold War(After)...............................................................................................16 
Table 5. Mergers of the First Wave by Type(After) ......................................................27 
Table 6. Number of Mergers of the First Wave(After)..................................................28 
Table 7. Ten Largest Acquisitions 1981 – 1989 (Aftrer)...............................................34 
Table 8. Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of Mergers by Decade(From) ........36 
Table 9. Prime Contractors in Defense Markets Sectors (1990-98)(From)...................54 
Table 10. Percentage of Total Procurement Prime Actions (above $25,000)(After) ......55 
Table 11. Database Table Example used for Unit Cost Growth Calculation ..................70 
Table 12. Distribution of systems examined among different categories........................73 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics of Systems calculated Cost Growth ..............................74 
Table 14. Distribution of Cost Growth Values ................................................................74 
Table 15. Systems examined Before Consolidation (prior 1993)....................................76 
Table 16. Systems Examined including Consolidation period (between 1993 - 1997)...78 
Table 17. Systems examined After Consolidation period (after 1997)............................80 
Table 18. Distribution of Cost Growth Values ................................................................81 
Table 19. NAICS categories for Selected Programs(After).............................................83 
Table 20. HHI Values for NAICS categories for Selected Programs (After)..................84 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to express our sincere and warm thanks to our primary advisor, Dr 
Nayantara Hensel and Senior Lecturer Don Summers, Associate Advisor for their help, 
guidance support and patience during the course of this research effort. Their invaluable 
assistance and attention to detail contributed to the successful completion of this study. 
Last but not least we would like to thank our families, for their love, and 
understanding during the trying days of this research effort. Their support was essential in 
the successful completion of this thesis. 
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War created expectations and hopes among the majority of 
nations and global institutions and organizations for a more peaceful and prosperous 
future. It is now a common perception, after 9/11, that these expectations do not reflect 
today’s reality. Expenditures for National Defense have once again reached high levels. 
At the same time new and extremely complicated global security issues have emerged 
which demand quick and effective responses. The defense industry can reasonably be 
considered among the industrial sectors of primary importance for the U.S. economy with 
an integral contribution to the entire security environment. Furthermore, the U.S. defense 
industry, as a major international weapon systems provider, is of global importance from 
both security and economic perspectives. 
The evolution of technology, as well as the expectations and needs of the potential 
user, are some of the major causes, which drive the increase of development and 
procurement costs of weapon systems. Critical modern weapon systems such as fighter 
aircrafts are now delivered in smaller quantities, providing more capabilities for multiple 
missions.  
After the end of the Cold War period, the U.S. defense industry underwent a very 
extensive consolidation phase. The end of this period of intensive mergers and 
acquisitions activity left only a handful of major defense contractors in the market. One 
sensible expected outcome of this consolidation was the increase of the efficiency of the 
defense contractors with subsequent results on the costs of weapon systems, ultimately 
saving money for the government. Thus, the federal government had actively supported 
the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the defense industry. Nevertheless, numerous 
concerns have been expressed and several issues were addressed in studies and surveys 
by governmental and non-governmental research institutes and organizations. 
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B.  OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The U.S. defense budget is the highest in the world. Defense expenditures 
actually represent a very high percentage of the total amount spent for defense on a 
global basis. This fact alone makes it interesting to survey the possible realized savings 
due to the acquisitions and mergers, which took place in the defense industrial sector. The 
primary objective of this project is to survey whether and at what degree the 
consolidation of the U.S. defense industry led to any significant benefits for the federal 
government and taxpayers, mainly in terms of the cost growth of the weapon systems 
acquired by the U.S. Armed Forces. This thesis analyzes the cost growth of the major 
weapon systems acquisition programs, in an effort to identify trends and/or patterns and 
additionally draw conclusions concerning the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry. 
There have been numerous expressions of doubt and questioning whether the 
consolidation has actually offered significant benefits and whom these benefits serve. It is 
rather obvious that the conditions, needs, and purposes of the consolidation of the U.S. 
defense industry reflected the particular period prior to the War on Terror. Consequently, 
the question raised is whether, under the current circumstances and within the newly 
shaped global environment, consolidation has been and remains in the best interests of 
the government and the taxpayers. 
The results of this survey can be studied and used in different ways and levels. At 
the policy level, it is possible that a requirement for a reform of the acquisition system 
will be identified, at certain aspects, in order to be able to cope with a market 
environment where competition is limited. In addition, under the expectation of a 
possible new wave of consolidation, the lessons learned from the previous consolidation 
can act as one of the guidelines in which to timely form a response policy. The weapon 
systems cost growth is one of the primary indicators that can reveal the overall picture of 
the results of the consolidation. Cost growth can also be used as a descriptive tool for the 
overall situation and effectiveness of the defense market and its rules and institutions, 
which govern the procurement process. Possible discernible patterns of the cost growth 
over time and different categories of systems and contractors might indicate necessary 
policy initiatives for quick and effective response, regardless of the long-term causes and 
3 
the possible relationship of the cost growth with the defense industry consolidation. On 
the other hand, cost growth can be affected by many other different factors. The degree to 
which each one of these factors actually affects cost growth can be very to estimate 
accurately. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary and secondary research questions were created in order to 
facilitate the analysis of cost growth of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAP), 
in an effort to identify trends and/or patterns. Additionally these questions are useful for 
drawing conclusions concerning whether the merger and acquisition activity of the 1990s 
led to consolidation of the U.S. defense industry competition, and, possibly, costs. 
1. Primary Questions 
• Is there any obvious impact caused from the consolidation to the cost 
growth of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAP)? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• What were the causes that led to U.S. defense industry consolidation? 
• Are there any identifiable trends of the weapon systems cost growth based 
on the information, which are included in the Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SAR)? 
• Are there any obvious consequences of the consolidation for the U.S. and 
foreign buyers of U.S. weapon systems? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is limited by design to focus on cost changes of major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP). The total defense budget expenditure is not restricted only 
at the MDAP. At any given time, there are around seven hundred DoD major and minor 
programs. Because the submission of data is mandatory for major programs, this thesis 
looks at the 358 of them that are being reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SARs). The use of SARs makes accessing data relatively simple. The use of certain 
selection criteria as discussed in a later chapter reduces the number of programs analyzed 
4 
to 113. Although acquisition policy reform is a perpetual activity, this thesis narrowly 
focuses on those policies that impact consolidation or program cost changes. This thesis 
investigates whether mergers, and at what degree the consolidation of the U.S. defense 
industry, led to any significant benefits for the federal government and taxpayers, mainly 
in terms of the cost growth of the weapon systems acquired by the U.S. Armed Forces. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This analysis compares baseline year and current year (reflecting the date, which 
the respective report was issued) cost estimates (all in base year dollars for each 
individual program) of defense programs that fall among the largest defense contractors 
to see if savings are realized post-merger. Chapter II includes the literature review and 
incorporates a wide narrative of the trends that appeared and influenced policies towards 
U.S. defense expenditures and weapon systems exports, during and mainly after the Cold 
War. In addition, a brief description of the theory of merger waves is provided in order to 
make the reader familiar with the concepts of merger and acquisitions activity as they 
appeared in the history of U.S. economy. The basic governmental policy, which was 
implemented and supported the consolidation, is also depicted. Chapter III describes the 
method applied for the calculations of cost growth of the MDAPs based on the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARs) database. It also contains a brief explanation of the 
information included in the SAR along with the various difficulties and limitations in the 
exploitation of these data. Chapter IV describes quantitative statistical analysis and 
results. Lastly, Chapter V provides the answers to the research questions and the 
conclusions based on the results and the other qualitative information that was available. 
These conclusions have to do mostly with the defense industry consolidation, but also 
touch upon other aspects of the defense acquisition policy. Recommendations for areas of 
further research are provided to complement these findings. 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
A. THE COURSE TO THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. policy towards the issue of defense expenditures has undergone 
numerous changes throughout the years. There have been periods when the 
administration chose to follow a more conservative route, expressing concerns that an 
approach of maintaining high defense budgets on a constant basis could potentially bear 
devastating consequences for the economy of the country. On the other hand, especially 
following 9/11 and the ongoing War on Terror, a continuously high level of defense 
spending can be observed. 
2. U.S. Defense Procurement Expenditures 
The Cold War constituted a turning point for defense related spending of the U.S. 
in the sense that it was the first prolonged period of peace when the U.S. maintained such 
a high level of readiness, work force and equipment for the Armed Forces. The threat of 
the Communist block was real, regardless of the fact that it did not escalate further than 
regional conflicts, and the response to this threat from the U.S. had an impact on the level 
of necessary resources. The peak of the approach of high-level defense spending was 
reached during the Reagan administration (1981-1989), having already started to increase 
during the last two years of the Carter administration. The majority of the taxpayers, who 
perceived the Communist threat as real and imminent, generally supported this. In 1980, 
military expenditures reached 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and rose to 6.2% 
in 1986, a percentage below the levels reached during the Vietnam War; but this had been 
a direct conflict with massive mobilization and full-scale military operations.1 The higher 
                                                 
1  Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars (New York: Times Books, 
2007), 229. 
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defense budget was a vital part of a policy to force the Soviet Union to negotiate under 
financial and military burdens that would eventually surpass the actual Soviet economic 
capabilities through an extended period.2  
It is important to note that the U.S. has traditionally been the global leader in 
defense spending. More specifically, in 2006 the U.S. spent approximately 46% of the 
global defense-spending total, while the difference with the second largest defense budget 
is almost 900%.3 Therefore, it is obvious that even small percentage changes in the U.S. 
defense budget will reflect in large actual amounts that can have important consequences 
from a financial and economic point of view for the industry. 
The U.S. defense expenditures for procurement, like the whole defense budget, 
have followed different trends over time, responding to the changes in international 
conditions and security needs. World Wars and regional conflicts are among the periods 
with direct and usually high changes on the defense budget. After every period of high 
increases in demand for procurement in the defense sector, a transitional phase followed 
to adapt to the peace period and the defense industry had to follow this course. A 
“cyclical” pattern in this sense is observable on defense procurement expenditures. 
However, the levels of the differences in procurement spending are different from period 
to period. The changes in the required industrial capacity can be of a very high scale. At 
the same time, with the advances in technology and the subsequent sophistication and 
multitude of the weapon systems that are procured, the complexity of the industry and its 
variety of activities are increasing. 
Based on the official historical data of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) we can derive a reliable and descriptive picture of the course of the defense 
expenditures of the U.S. over time. More specifically, we can observe the procurement 
expenditures, which can be considered as a clear indication for the level of amounts that 
are transferred to the defense contractors. The levels are comparable because the amounts 
                                                 
2 Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars (New York: Times Books, 
2007), 229. 
3 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), “Recent trends in military expenditure,” 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html, (accessed April 15, 2008). 
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are converted in constant dollars of FY 2000, based on the deflation factors provided by 
the OMB. The procurement expenditures part of the defense budget is of primary interest 
to the defense contractors, since it constitutes an indication of the anticipated level of 
major acquisition programs, providing a basis for estimate for the industrial capacity that 
is actually necessary to support the demand. Furthermore, procurement spending levels 
can attract new investments in equipment, infrastructure, research and development 
(R&D), or even bring new entrants into this market, enhancing competition. 
Figure 1 depicts the U.S. Defense procurement spending from 1941 to 2009. The 
peak of the World War II period was beyond comparison with any other period, 
involving an enormous national effort and commitment, with a full-scale global war, 
fought in different battlefields and areas concurrently. Therefore, the period after 1949 is 
more appropriate to estimate and compare the levels for procurement defense 
expenditures and draw conclusions relevant to the defense industry for “normal” periods. 
However, one cannot ignore the historical value of the particular period in terms of the 
conclusions that can be drawn related to the smooth transition and adaptation to a 
peaceful period. The period that followed World War II, especially from 1947 until 1951, 
had the lowest levels of procurement spending for the period after 1941 until today. 
It is clear that the highest levels of procurement, after the World War II peak, took 
place during President’s Reagan defense buildup period in the 1980s as depicted in 
Figure 2. By the end of this period, an approximately $92 billion (CY 2000), was 
budgeted for defense procurement, reaching $143 billion including the R&D spending for 
defense purposes. After 1989, a gradual reduction of the defense procurement 
expenditures followed. It is interesting, though, that despite the decreasing trend the 
actual procurement budget levels remained considerably higher than they had been in the 
period of the 1970s and the 1950s, after the war in Korea. In addition, the peak in the 
years of the Vietnam War produced levels far lower than the 1980s. The reduction of the 
defense procurement expenditures can be assessed with different criteria. 
8 




























































































































































Figure 1.   U.S. Defense Procurement 1941-2009 (After4) 
 
                                                 
4 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 
2000 constant dollars. Amounts for FY 08 and FY 09 are estimates. 
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Figure 2.   U.S. Defense Procurement 1950-2009 (After5) 
                                                 
5 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. Government FY2009.” All amounts in FY 
2000 constant dollars. Amounts for FY 08 and FY 09 are estimates. 
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Clearly, if we consider the levels of the 1990s with the period of President 
Reagan’s buildup, the reduction is dramatic (almost 50% from 1989 to 1997, or 40% if 
we include the R&D expenditures). On the other hand, if we broaden our base of 
comparison, we can derive that the defense procurement expenditures actually returned to 
their “normal” levels before this specific period of buildup policy. The levels of the 
buildup period were only reached again after 2004, with the ongoing Global War on 
Terror, after 9/11. The R&D expenditures for defense remained high in the 1990s, and 
their reduction was relatively small as shown in Figure 3.  
Conclusively, from a quantitative standpoint, the buildup of the 1980s cannot be 
considered as the most characteristic period of reference for U.S. defense expenditures. 
Even during war times, when actual military operations took place, there was not a 
demand sufficient to support such levels of defense expenditures. The results of this 
policy are mostly a historical matter, which has been addressed and studied extensively. 
Today we know that it has been an effective means of pressure against the Communist 
Block. However, based on the long history of the U.S. defense expenditures, we need to 
consider the bigger picture in order to draw conclusions.  
The basic statistical indicators of the official OMB data (including R&D 
expenditures) give a median of approximately $90 billion (constant year 2000, hereafter 
CY 2000) for the period after 1949, including the high estimates for 2008 and 2009 as 
depicted in Figure 4. For the period of the 1990s, the lowest level of spending was almost 
equal to the median, and slightly lower than the mean (approximately $92 billion, CY 
2000). 
Overall, if we look back upon the history of procurement defense expenditures, 
we can identify different periods of large-scale reductions, following a period of high 
spending due to a war. These periods are after World War II, after the Korean War and 
after the Vietnam War.  
11 


































































































































Figure 3.   R&D Expenditures 1950-2009 (After6) 
                                                 
6 Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 2000 
constant dollars. Amounts for FY 08 and FY 09 are estimates. 
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Figure 4.   Defense Procurement and R&D 1950-2009 (After7) 
                                                 
7 Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 2000 
constant dollars. Amounts for FY 08 and FY 09 are estimates. 
13 
As mentioned previously, World War II required a mobilization of a national 
scale, economically and industrially, along with other areas of activity. In Table 1 is 
presented the evolution of procurement spending in the period during World War II and 
in the years that followed. The Roosevelt administration performed detailed planning in 
order to deal with the demobilization that would follow the end of the War, including the 
defense industrial base. Legislative measures were taken for returning factories into 
civilian production, and the transformation of the industry took place successfully.8 This 
proactive approach managed to avoid undesired turbulences, directing the economy to the 
peace needs and exploiting the increased post-war demand for commercial products.9 
 








199.62 345.54    
            
1946 119.75 -65.34% 
1947 16.70 -86.05% 
1948 9.96 -40.40% 
1949 8.14 -18.24% 
1950 7.12 
32.33 119.75 338.42 
-12.53% 
-44.51% 
Table 1.   World War II (After10) 
The Korean War presented a somewhat different picture as depicted in Table 2. 
The scale of the mobilization was much lower than the previous one, while the necessary 
reduction was even smaller, since a large military force was maintained to be able to 
effectively respond to the Soviet threat.11 
                                                 
8 Jacques S. Gansler, Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of Democracy (The twentieth 
century fund, MIT Press, 1995), 7. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Amounts in billions of CY 2000. 
11 Gansler, Defense Conversion, 8. 
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48.02 71.23    
            
1955 52.08 -22.22% 
1956 46.83 -10.08% 
1957 48.52 3.61% 
1958 48.93 0.86% 
1959 49.24 
49.12 52.08 24.40 
0.64% 
-5.44% 
Table 2.   Korean War (After12) 
After the Vietnam War, the situation resembled the one that followed the Cold 
War, in the sense that the production of military systems had greatly differentiated from 
the commercial industry as shown in Table 3. 














49.17 72.49    
       
1976 29.22 -7.13% 
1977 30.23 3.47% 
1978 30.98 2.46% 
1979 37.16 19.97% 
1980 39.78 
33.47 39.78 43.27 
7.06% 
5.17% 
Table 3.   Vietnam War(After13) 
                                                 
12 Amounts in billions of CY 2000. 
13 Ibid. 
15 
This posed severe difficulties to the transformation of the defense industrial base, 
resulting in the loss of many jobs and governmental initiatives to provide some relief to 
former defense industry employees.14 
Initially, after the collapse of the Communist Block and the Soviet Union, a wide 
impression prevailed that the defense expenditures were going to follow a declining trend 
towards unprecedented low levels, due to the fact that no other kind of threat was 
perceived as potentially requiring resources as many as needed to effectively confront the 
former Warsaw Pact.15 Another approach to depict the intensity of the downward trend 
of the period after the Cold War is to compare it with the other periods that followed War 
mobilizations, in terms of the procurement expenditures as illustrated in Table 4.16  
Tables 1 through 4 can assist in realizing the actual intensity of the reduction of 
defense procurement expenditures. It is important to note that the amounts do not include 
R&D expenditures. It is clear that the maximum reduction that took place after the Cold 
War, meaning the difference between the maximum amount spent within the period of 
increase during the War and the minimum amount spent during the period of reduction 
after the War, was $44.39 billion, an amount comparable to the $43.27 billion of the 
period after the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the mean percentage of the reduction of the 
post-Cold War era of 5.67% is comparable to the 5.44% after the Korean War. 
We can derive from these numbers that the percentages of reduction and the rate 
of the reduction of the post-Cold War period were not unprecedented from a historical 
point of view. What is interesting, though, is that the defense industry actually lost a high 
amount of revenue: during a ten-year period after 1992, the defense industry made 
approximately $208 billion less than the period of 1982-1991.  
                                                 
14 Gansler, Defense Conversion, 8-9. 
15 Ibid, 9.  
16 Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International 
Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999-2000): 5-51. 
16 
Another simple quantitative measure in order to assist in understanding the 
intensity of the changes of procurement spending over time is the ratio of the current to 
the previous year’s value of spending. This measure depicts the degree of smoothness of 
the changes in procurement spending. As Figure 5 above shows, beginning from the 
period of World War II, the transitions become smoother over time. The turbulence in 
defense procurement spending appears to be less intense over time, with the exception of 
the current period (but we have to take into account that the last values are projected and 
not actual). More specifically, for the period of 1980-1991 the ratio values are in the 
range of 0.97 – 1.17, while for the period of 1991 – 2001 the range is 0.86 – 1.1. 
Although there is a significant difference, we can clearly identify much higher values in 
previous periods.  Therefore, by this additional measure, we can reasonably conclude that 
the period following the end of the Cold War does not constitute something unique or 
unprecedented in the historical course of the defense budget’s procurement spending. 















   
              
1992 79.70 -10.17% 
1993 73.22 -8.13% 
1994 63.02 -13.93% 
1995 54.91 -12.87% 
1996 48.59 -11.51% 
1997 47.68 -1.87% 
1998 48.75 2.24% 
1999 49.05 0.62% 
2000 51.29 
57.36 79.7 44.39 
4.57% 
-5.67% 
Table 4.   Cold War(After17) 
                                                 
17 Amounts in billions of CY 2000. 
17 























































































































































Figure 5.   Defense Procurement Spending Ratio 1942-2009 [Year(n)/Year(n-1)] (After18) 
                                                 
18 Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 2000 
constant dollars. Amounts for FY 08 and FY 09 are estimates. 
18 
Another important factor that needs to be considered is the actual revenue of the 
U.S. Defense Industry over time in order to identify indications, in terms of changes in 
revenue, which could have triggered, or at least significantly contributed to, the massive 
consolidation wave. The revenue of the U.S. Defense Industry comes from multiple 
sources: weapons systems exports need to be examined, as an important portion of the 
total revenue. If we consider the sum (approximate) of U.S. Defense Procurement and 
Weapons Systems exports for the period of 1989-1999, we can identify a decreasing 
trend, especially after 1991. Despite the increasing contribution of weapons systems 
exports, the reduction in defense procurement of the U.S. caused a very significant 
overall decrease to the (approximate) revenue for the U.S. Defense Industry. 
U.S. Weapon Systems Exports (Deliveries & Agreements) 1989-1999 
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Figure 6.   U.S. Weapon Systems Exports 1989-1999 (After19) 
For the period of 1989-1999, the weapons systems exports had significant 
changes, following an increasing path from 1989 until 1991; but after that, a reduction is 
observed. Figure 6 illustrates this trend. Overall, the trend for the specific period is 
relatively stable, and the exports did not fall below $50 billion, in constant 2000 dollars. 
What is also an interesting measure for the course of the defense industry is the role and 
the importance of the exports of the weapons systems, in comparison with the U.S. 
                                                 
19 U.S. Department of State, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers” (WMEAT) release of 
February 6, 2003. 
19 
Defense Procurement for the same period. The importance of the exports can be 
expressed by the ratio of the value of exports (including deliveries and agreements) to the 
value of the U.S. defense procurement. We can identify that after 1993, the value of 
exports exceeded the value of DoD procurement (Figure 7), a fact that can clearly be 
attributed to the reduction of the procurement budget and the increase of exports, even if 
this was unstable.  
Conclusively, there are not any significant indications (Figure 8) that the 
procurement spending after the end of the Cold War followed a unique pattern, which 
would require a large-scale unprecedented reaction of the defense industry. At any rate, 
this does not appear to be the overarching reason behind the turbulences of this industrial 
sector. Under this perspective other causes, apart from (or in combination with) 
procurement spending, must be analyzed to identify their relationship with the 
consolidation of the U.S. Defense Industry.  
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Figure 7.   Ratio of U.S. Exports/U.S. Procurement (After20) 
                                                 
20 Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the 
U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 2000 constant dollars. The conversion was done using the 
deflation factors of the OMB tables. 
20 
Approximate sum of U.S . Procurement Spending & Exports (1989-1999)
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Figure 8.   Sum of U.S. Procurement Spending and Exports (1989-1999)(After21) 
B. MERGERS AND MERGER WAVES  
1. Introduction 
Every individual firm might be regarded as an entity, which is continually under 
the effect of both internal and external influences. The practice of referring to biological 
analogies to describe the general life cycle of a typical company is no longer considered 
appropriate for the modern world of business. Although it is well thought-out and old-
fashioned, there is still an existing resemblance and one can effectively illustrate the life 
of a firm applying biological analogies. According to this belief,  
a company is born, struggles to survive, grows through adolescence and 
then reaches maturity. Eventually, it will die, either through natural causes 
and a slow deterioration into old age or it may be absorbed into another, 
more predatory, firm. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity represents 
the second of these options and provides a way for company assets to be 
transferred from one set of owners to another.22 
                                                 
21 Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the 
U.S. Government FY 2009.” All amounts in FY 2000 constant dollars. The conversion was done using the 
deflation factors of the OMB tables. 
22 Sian Owen, “The history and mystery of merger waves: A UK and U.S. perspective,” (working 
paper number 2006-02, School of Banking and Finance, The University of New South Wales, 2006), 
http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/banking/workpap/wp_02_2006.pdf (accessed February 2008). 
21 
2. Terms and Definitions 
Throughout this thesis, there is a constant repetition of several M&A key terms. 
Therefore, it is considered beneficial for the reader to provide a list of definitions of those 
terms in an early stage. This way one can more easily understand the rest of the concepts 
and analysis presented in the following chapters. 
In a strict definition of the term, a merger23 (or statutory merger) describes the 
combination of two corporations in which only the one firm survives and the merged 
company disappears as a business entity. The acquiring company assumes all assets and 
liabilities of the acquired firm. In cases of subsidiary or reverse subsidiary mergers, both 
the acquiring and the acquired company survive after the merger.  
The term horizontal24 depicts a type of merger in which the target firm and the 
acquirer belong in the same line of business; in simple words, two competitors combine. 
One typical example of a horizontal merger is the $78.9 billion mega merger of Exxon 
and Mobil in 1998.  
Vertical is the type of merger that occurs between companies that are involved at 
different stages of production; suppliers merge with buyers or distributors. For example, 
the acquisition of Medco Containment Services from Merck, the world’s largest drug 
company, enabled the latter to go from being the largest pharmaceutical company to also 
being the largest integrated producer and distributor of pharmaceuticals.  
Finally, conglomerate merger is the type of merger that involves companies in 
unrelated lines of business; the merged companies are not competitors and do not have a 
buyer-seller relationship. This type of merger was the type that dominated the market in 
the 1960s and the 1970s but is less popular now. On the contrary, there is enough 
evidence25 that the majority of M&A activity in the 1980s and the 1990s came from the 
                                                 
23 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 4th ed. (New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), 12. 
24 Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, 8th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2005), 871. 
25 Ibid. 
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breaking up of the conglomerates created ten to twenty years earlier. A successful 
example of a conglomerate would be Phillip Morris, now called Altria. This company, by 
acquiring General Foods in 1985, Kraft in 1988, and Nabisco in 2000, achieved to 
diversify and shift from the U.S. tobacco industry that has experienced decline at an 
average rate of 2% to the food industry. 
The term consolidation26 is used to describe any business combination “whereby 
two or more companies join together to form an entirely new company.” 27 In such an 
activity, the consolidating firms cease their operating activities and the new entity solely 
continues to operate. The stakeholders of the combining companies become, after 
consolidation, stakeholders of the new firm. For example, in 1986 the computer 
manufacturers Burroughs and Sperry combined to form UNISYS. 
Although a majority of the time the two terms merger and consolidation are used 
interchangeably, there is a difference between the two activities. The easiest way to 
remember the difference is to think of merger with the notation A+B=A which means 
company B merged into company A, or it was acquired by company A. Similarly, for 
consolidation the most appropriate notation would be A+B=C, which is translated as the 
two companies A and B joined to form the entirely new company C. 
3. Motives for Mergers 
According to existing literature, several different motives attempt to interpret 
merger and acquisition activity of individual firms or market’s industries. The obtainable 
research has pointed to a number of speculative reasons, but to our understanding, there is 
no single answer about it. There is still ongoing qualitative and quantitative research that 
analyzes the potential factors through various perspectives. Following Gaughan’s 
simplified reasoning,28 we conclude to the following generic internal motives described 
below. 
                                                 
26 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 12. 
27 Ibid, 12. 
28 Ibid, 117. 
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Growth seems to be the most important among several other reasons. Companies 
that are trying to expand and evolve in their industry find it easier to accomplish their 
goals by M&A activity than by internal growth. This practice also tends to prove more 
convenient, as the total amount of money (premium included), that bidding firms are 
expected to pay is not necessarily more expensive than the relevant total cost to achieve 
internal growth.  The number of existing exceptions only enforces the hypothesis that 
“growth through mergers and acquisitions is significantly faster than through internal 
means. 29” 
The pursuit of synergistic benefits is another common motivation for M&A 
activity: the two (or more) merging entities are creating a positive synergy by combining 
the best attributes from each company.  Alternatively, the two (or more) combining firms 
will create value greater than the values of the two independent companies: 
Value (A+B) > Value (A) + Value (B). 
Cost economies and revenue enhancement are two different types of synergistic 
effects that managers are expecting to achieve.  However, synergistic gains are not 
always obvious to realize. “Possibilities of cost savings may be attributed to synergistic 
effects such as improved efficiency through organizational restructuring, improvements 
in technology, or capitalization of particular expertise.” 30 Cost economies have a lot to 
do with the reduction of per-unit cost and are typically easier to understand but not 
necessarily to achieve. On the other hand, revenue enhancement is even more difficult to 
predict. 
Diversification is another equally important but dubious driver. During the 1960s, 
businesses’ trend to diversify was highly regarded as one of the key drivers of the intense 
M&A activity. It is assumed that companies, in order to achieve growth, often try to 
expand outside their current industry category. Such an outward expansion, most of the 
time, is facilitated “by some creative financial techniques that temporarily cause the 
 
                                                 
29 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 12. 
30, Ibid, 126. 
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acquiring firm’s stock price to rise while adding little real  value through the 
exchange.”31 The results of decisions to diversify vary among companies that adopted 
this tactic. Many have regretted their attempts, where others (e.g., General Electric) claim 
to have gained significantly. 
There is no evidence for one to get restricted to the aforementioned reasons to 
understand why firms tend to merge. However, given the external factors of the economy 
pointing in the same direction, we get a brief but adequate explanation why in the history 
of the United States there were several periods identified that were characterized by 
increased levels of M&A activity across a wide spectrum of different markets’ industries. 
4. Merger Waves in the History of U.S. Industry 
There is much research available showing that one of the most remarkable 
characteristics of mergers is that they come in bunches. Whenever there are propitious 
circumstances such as evolving economy, capital market buoyancy, technological 
innovations, etc., to ignite the phenomenon of mergers in a certain industry sector, the 
number of transactions starts to increase rapidly. Soon after, the phenomenon expands 
outside the market where initially started, affecting a larger number of companies and 
industries. According to different economists, historians, and M&A specialists, five 
merger waves have been identified in the history of the United States as shown in figure 
9. The first two occurred before the Great Depression of 1929. The starting dates and the 
duration of each of these waves could not be precisely specified. Bruner32 recognizes 
only four waves, considering the last two of Gaughan’s33 depiction (fourth wave 1984-
1989, fifth wave 1992-2000) as one wave divided in two phases (wave 4a 1981-1987 and 
wave 4b 1992-2000). In addition to that, Lipton recognizes a sixth wave that started after 
the bursting of the Millennium Bubble in 2002 and is still ongoing (end of 2006).  
                                                 
31 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 126. 
32 Robert F. Bruner, Applied Mergers and Acquisitions (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), 
72-75. 
33 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 28-9. 
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Figure 9.   Number of Mergers in the United States, 1895 to 1990 (From34) 
Figures 9 and 10 are obviously supporting this hypothesis of merger waves. 
Figure 9 shows the number of mergers in the United States from 1895 until 1990. In 
Figure 10, the blue curve represents the number of mergers (beginning in the 1880s), and 
the yellow curve shows the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) price/earnings ratio (P/E) for the 
same period. “A close association between aggregate merger activity and the S&P P/E is 
apparent, and it can be regarded as the second major regularity in aggregate merger data. 
Any hypothesis that claims to explain merger waves must account for this 
relationship.”35 
                                                 
34 Linda Brewster Stearns and Kenneth D. Allan, “Economic Behavior in Institutional Environments: 
The Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 4 (August 1996): 699-
718, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2096400.pdf (accessed April 9, 2008). 
35 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, “The Determinants of Merger Waves,” 
(Discussion Paper, Series 05-15, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute),   
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/05-15.pdf (accessed February 20, 2008). 
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Figure 10.   Mergers & Average P/E Ratio (From 36) 
In the following paragraphs, a brief narrative of the five merger waves is 
provided, following Gaughan’s perspective, clarifying some of their major features and 
characteristics. 
a. First Merger Wave (1897 – 1904)37 
The first U.S. merger wave began at the end of the nineteenth century and 
succeeded the depression of 1883, which ended in 1896. Table 5 shows the types of 
mergers during this period. This wave affected a wide variety of firms, which eventually 
became highly concentrated, as the majority of mergers that occurred during this wave 
were horizontal.  Thus it was characterized by several scholars in the past (Stigler 1950) 
as a period of “merger for monopoly.”  During this period the principal steel, telephone, 
oil, mining, railroad and other giants of the basic manufacturing and transportation 
industries in the U.S. market were formed, such as DuPont, Standard Oil, Eastman Kodak 
and U.S. Steel.  A representative example of this period is the merger of U.S. Steel with 
                                                 
36 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, “The Determinants of Merger Waves,” 
(Discussion Paper, Series 05-15, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute),   
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/05-15.pdf (accessed February 20, 2008). 
37 Bruner, Applied Mergers and Acquisitions. According to Bruner this wave occurred from 1895–
1904. 
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Carnegie Steel and more than seven hundred other smaller steel firms. The resulting 
mega-steel company controlled 70~80% of the steel production in the United States. 
Type of Merger Percentage (%) 
Horizontal 78.3 
Vertical 12.0 
Horizontal & Vertical 9.7 
Total 100.0 
Table 5.   Mergers of the First Wave by Type(After38) 
The majority of the accessible literature describing the period and the 
prospective reasons that ignited the wave recognize, as factors that contributed most at 
the initiation, the capital market buoyancy on the one hand and the consequent 
introduction of the Antitrust Sherman Act in 1890 on the other. The latter was the first 
effort of the U.S. federal government to oppose the combination of entities that could 
possibly harm competition, such as cartels and monopolies, and it intended to prevent the 
artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply among different states and 
countries. The Department of Justice was largely responsible for the limited impact of the 
newly introduced law. However, the Sherman Act was vague and unable to oppose 
mergers and acquisitions using stock for stock exchange. Consequently, it could not 
prevent the dominance of an industry by a specific company if it was achieved solely by 
merit. As a result, taking into consideration their prior attitude towards trusts, several 
companies took advantage of the misconception of the law and started to form near 
monopolies, without any regulatory interference, igniting a massive reorganization of the 
industrial landscape of the United States. The first U.S. merger wave was a fact causing 
eighteen hundred firms of different market sectors to disappear.39 Ninety-three 
consolidated firms were created instead with an important, if not dominant, share of the 
market in their respective industries. 
                                                 
38 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 31. 





















Figure 11.   Mergers of the First Wave 1895-1904 (After 40) 
 









Table 6.   Number of Mergers of the First Wave(After41) 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901-1907) policy towards trusts and 
monopolies, which made him known as a “trust buster,” ultimately contributed to the 
reduction of the number of mergers as depicted in Figure 11 and Table 6. His decision in 
1902 to enforce the Sherman Antitrust Act in the famous Northern Securities Case 
proved to be an important turning point of the first wave. A U.S. Supreme Court decision 
                                                 
40 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 31. 
41 Ibid. 
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in 1904 to extend the application of Sherman Antitrust law to horizontal mergers, and 
then the First World War, are pointed to as the causes of the end of the first wave. 
b. Second Merger Wave (1916 – 1929) 
The second merger wave began almost twenty years after the peak of the 
first wave. Again, regulatory changes towards trusts, as long as the “federal government’s 
encouragement of the formation of business cooperatives to enhance the nation’s 
productivity as part of the war effort,” 42 were the most important reasons that led to the 
initiation of this wave. During President William Howard Taft’s administration, the 
Justice Department succeeded in breaking up some of the major trusts, regardless of the 
fact that his predecessor (President Teddy Roosevelt) held the reputation of being the 
trust buster. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1911 to accuse and prosecute 
Standard Oil (John D. Rockefeller) for discriminatory practices and abuse of power in the 
oil industry was a clear sign of the upcoming changes of the legal framework towards 
monopolies. The introduction of Clayton Act in 1914, which was designed specifically to 
level out the weaknesses of the previous legislation (Sherman Act), strengthened the U.S. 
government’s attitude towards antitrust enforcement. 
The new legislation was actively encouraging companies to form 
oligopolies instead of monopolies. Thus, Stigler (1950) characterized this period as a 
“merger for oligopolies.” The majority of transactions that occurred during this second 
wave were vertical mergers. In addition, many companies in unrelated business merged, 
hence introducing the first large-scale formation of conglomerates. Although mergers 
affected industries across the board, certain industries such as primary metals, petroleum 
products, food products, chemicals and transportation equipment experienced a 
disproportionately large number of transactions. Large companies that still operate today 
were integrated at that time, such as Ford, General Motors, John Deere and the Union 
Carbide Corporation. In order to understand the intensity of transactions of this second 
wave, between 1926 and 1930, 4,600 mergers took place and almost 12,000 firms 
                                                 
42 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 38. 
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disappeared from the business map, compared to the relatively smaller numbers of 2,943 
and 1,800 respectively, of the first wave.  
Another very interesting feature of this merger wave (common also to the 
first one) was the major influence that investment bankers exercised among senior 
business executives. A reason for that was the tendency of companies that started using 
debt to finance the deals that were taking place. Therefore, when bankers thought that a 
merger was against the bank’s policies or ethical interests, they had no problem vetoing 
any deal and withholding funds from firms seeking financing. The increased influence 
they could impose derived from the fact that in those years only a small number of 
investment banks held the majority of capital available for financing M&A activity, as 
the investment banking industry was more concentrated. This wave coincided with a 
boom in the stock market that began following the recession of 1923 and ended with the 
stock market crash on “Black Tuesday,” (October 29, 1929) the largest market drop in 
history until October 1987. This market collapse signaled the beginning of the Great 
Depression, and hence, the end of the second merger wave. 
c. Third Merger Wave (1965 – 1969) 
The economic prosperity of the 1960s, as well as the concurrent increase 
of the stock market, created the ideal environment for the third wave to burst out. 
Although there were sings of increased merger activity even from the mid 1950s, the 
peak of this wave occurred later. The strong economy provided firms with the required 
resources to acquire other companies, but the political environment of the 1960s (the 
Johnson Administration of 1963-1969), was highly against monopolistic trends and 
favored aggressive antitrust enforcement. The overall antitrust stance of the federal 
government was strengthened with the introduction of the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950. 
According to existing legislation (Clayton Act of 1914), the acquisition of other firms’ 
stock was considered illegal when the transaction resulted in a merger, which was 
significantly reducing the degree of competition within an industry.  
However, the existing law could not ban the anticompetitive acquisition of 
the targeted firm’s assets. The Celler-Kefauver Act was introduced to address this 
31 
loophole of the law.43 Consequently, horizontal mergers became less popular, the total 
number of both horizontal and vertical dealings was reduced and another kind of 
transaction appeared and dominated the market: conglomerate mergers. Since all kinds of 
deals were subject to strict antitrust enforcement, profitable companies with large cash 
flows available that were unwilling to pay out to shareholders in the form of dividends, 
tried to diversify and expanded their business outside one industry category as an 
alternative way to utilize these funds. Many major established firms accepted the concept 





















Figure 12.   Number of Mergers 1963-1980(After44) 
Throughout this period, the majority of deals were friendly arrangements 
and stock was the primary medium of exchange. Until that time, the term “diversified 
firms” was applicable to those firms that owned some subsidiaries outside the main 
industry category where the majority of their business activities were concentrated. The 
conglomerates that were formed, such as IT&T, Ling-Temco-Vaught (LTV), Teledyne 
and Litton Industries, had a large percentage of their activities dispersed in different 
industries. Another reason that accelerated the conglomerate movement during this third 
wave was the rapid growth of management science and the introduction of related  
                                                 
43 Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring, 41. 
44 Ibid. 
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concepts in the business world. All the introduced management methodologies and 
principles enhanced the belief that even the most complex organizations could be 
manageable.  
The intensity of this wave compared to the years before and after (in 
number of transactions) is presented in Figure 12. According to Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) reports, almost 80% of the mergers that took place in the ten-year 
period between 1965 and 1975 were conglomerate mergers.45 The strength of this trend 
is also illustrated by the fact that the number of conglomerate firms increased from 8.3% 
of Fortune 500 firms in 1959 to 18.7% in 1969.46 Although almost 6,000 mergers took 
place and more than 25,000 firms disappeared, neither competition nor market 
concentration in the U.S. economy was affected. President Richard M. Nixon, who took 
office in 1969, was generally more tolerant of merger activity. The tough antitrust 
enforcement of the Justice Department ended in 1972 as the Supreme Court failed to 
accept the interpretation of antitrust laws adopted from the Department of Justice. The 
conglomerate stocks crashed in 1969-70 and the diversified companies never achieved 
the benefits expected to be derived from diversification.47 The oil crisis of 1973 resulted 
in a sharp increase in inflation and a worldwide economic downturn, which marked the 
end of this merger wave. 
d. Fourth Merger Wave (1984-1989) 
The downward trend that characterized M&A activity in the decade of 
1970–1980 started to change in 1981. The period of economic prosperity of the latter half 
of the 1980s gave the signal for a fourth merger wave, generally referred to as the merger 
wave of the 1980s, or the takeover wave, which coincided with the Ronald Reagan 
administration. According to Sian Owen: 
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It is also worth noting that the 1980s was a period in which 
companies had to respond to a series of shocks that impacted on 
just about every type of company. These included the growth of 
industrial deregulation, severe changes in the costs of inputs, such 
as oil, and the rapid developments in technology that took place 
throughout this period. 48 
Despite the fact that the first major hostile bid, which was to acquire ESB 
by Morgan Stanley on behalf of Inco, was made in 1974 before this fourth wave had 
started, the unique characteristic of this wave was the significant role of hostile mergers. 
Hostile mergers had already become an acceptable form of corporate expansion since 
190849 and therefore many firms had played the takeover game for maximization of their 
profits in a very short time. The distinction between friendly and hostile transactions was 
based on the reaction of the target company’s board of directors. The merger was 
considered friendly if the board approved the takeover; if the board was opposed, the 
takeover was considered hostile. Although the absolute number of hostile takeovers is not 
high with respect to the total number of takeovers, the relative percentage of hostile 
takeovers in the total value of takeovers is large. The term corporate raider50 was 
introduced during this period in the vocabulary of corporate finance in order to define the 
person who was making profits by takeover attempts without ever taking ownership of 
the targeted firm. The basic concept of the raiders’ efforts was concentrated in selling the 
target company’s shares at a price higher than the original one they paid to acquire them 
in the first place. 
Another notable characteristic of the merger wave of the 1980s was the 
size and prominence of the M&A targets. The volume of transactions and the size of 
deals exceeded any precedent making this wave known as the wave of the mega merger. 
Some of the largest firms in the country, companies which due to their size were 
considered untouchable in the past, “became the targets of unwelcome acquisition bids 
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and fought vigorously to defend themselves;” 51 consequently, the amount of money that 
was spent to complete such deals was very large. Table 7 lists the ten largest acquisitions 
during this period. It was the era of the billion dollar deals. “Almost half of all major U.S. 
companies were the recipients of an unsolicited takeover bid in the 1980, which is a clear 
indicator of the volume of transactions taking place during this particular wave.”52 The 
volume of transactions was not equally distributed among the different industry areas. 
During the first half of the 1980s, the oil and gas industry accounted for 21.6% of the 
total volume of M&A activity,53 while during the other half the large volume of deals 
shifted towards drugs and medical equipment. Deregulation in the industry that showed 
the large volume of transactions seemed to be the reason for this disproportionate 
distribution of deals among the industries. When, for example, the airline industry was 
deregulated, airfares became subject to competition. Consequently, some air carriers 
could no longer compete effectively, causing their position in the market to deteriorate, 
resulting in a consolidation in the industry. 
Year Buyer Target Price ($Billions) 
1988 Kohlberg Kravis RJR Nabisco 25.1 
1984 Chevron Gulf Oil 13.3 
1988 Philip Morris Kraft 13.1 
1989 Bristol Myers Squibb 12.5 
1984 Texaco  Getty Oil 10.1 
1981 DuPont Conoco 8.0 
1987 British Petroleum Standard Oil of Ohio 7.8 
1981 U.S. Steel Marathon Oil 6.6 
1988 Campeau Federated Stores 6.5 
1986 Kohlberg Kravis Beatrice 6.2 
Table 7.   Ten Largest Acquisitions 1981 – 1989 (Aftrer54) 
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In addition to the aforementioned during this fourth merger wave, some 
additional characteristics appeared such as the aggressive role of investment bankers, the 
aggressive use of debt, etc. Those additional features differentiated this period from 
anything known in the history of U.S. mergers. This merger wave is also the one that 
generated the greatest volume of academic analysis and a plethora of different reasons 
has been put forward for its taking place. One possible reason is that the U.S. government 
relaxed some of the restrictions on takeover activity that the earlier law had put in place. 
An alternative explanation is that it represented a return to specialization after the 
excessive diversification and expansion of the 1960s wave. Many of the companies that 
were most active during the earlier merger wave found that there were incredible 
difficulties inherent in managing a company spread over many different markets and 
countries. 
According to Gaughan’s rationalization the fourth merger wave ended in 
1989, following the end of the long economic expansion of the 1980s that led the 
economy to a mild recession as well as the collapse of the junk bond market, which had 
financed many of the leverage buy-outs (LBOs) of the period. 
e. Fifth Merger Wave (1992-2000)  
The fifth merger wave followed the economic recession of 1990-91, 
coincided with Clinton’s administration, and exceeded all of the previous waves in both 
number of transactions and value. This was the largest post-war period of expansion of 
the U.S. economy, a fact that was creating supporting conditions for the development of 
the fifth wave. However, apart from that, there is strong evidence that the high rate of 
deregulation, which occurred in several different industries as well as technological 
innovations, played a crucial role to expansion of this wave. Due to the aforementioned, 
some scholars have characterized the 1990s as the “decade of deregulation.”55 Aside 
from the type of transactions (horizontal mergers), the last two waves have little in 
common. The number of hostile transactions was reduced to a minimum, resulting in this 
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wave being regarded as entirely friendly; only 4% of deals were denoted as hostile. 
Another very important difference was the popularity of stock as the basic medium of 
transactions. Debt-financed mergers were less common, while the use of stock was 
increased by approximately 50% compared to the wave of the 1980s. Table 8 was 
adopted from a recent study and depicts in detail the differences in the nature of merger 
and acquisition activity, which occurred in the years from 1973 until 1998. “A possible 
cause for the change in nature of deals from the hostility of the 1980s to the more 
restrained activity of the 1990s is the improvement of the framework in corporate 
governance.”56  
 
Table 8.   Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of Mergers by Decade(From57) 
During the 1990s, the level and the effectiveness of monitoring the 
transactions increased greatly. The attitude of the managers towards those deals was 
totally altered as it became much more difficult for them to enter into highly risky deals. 
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They did not want to repeat the same mistakes of the previous period during which many 
of the transactions made had only short-term financial gains. They were forced to 
consider more carefully whether or not to enter the market; thus, they “focused more on 
strategic deals that did not unduly rely on leverage.” 58 
As had happened with all the waves in the past, this fifth wave introduced 
another unique characteristic in the competition of companies for corporate control. “In 
the mid-1990s, the market became enthralled with consolidating deals — what were 
called roll-ups.”59 The strategy behind roll-ups was to put together smaller companies 
into national business and enjoy economies of scale. The defense industry was included 
among others with those that tried to create efficiencies adopting this policy of roll-up 
deals. In addition to that, as the idea of globalization, a concept that was introduced in the 
1990s, and global economy was evolving, the demand for growth became imminent. On 
the assumption that size matters, companies of unprecedented size and global reach were 
created as shown in Figures 13 and 14. 
 
Figure 13.   Top Ten Deals Worldwide(From60) 
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The relatively controlled antitrust environment, as well as the new global 
view of competition, is responsible for the formation of once-unthinkable combinations. 
Citibank and Travelers, Chrysler and Daimler Benz, Exxon and Mobil, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas, AOL and Time Warner, and Vodafone and Mannesmann were 
some of the huge mergers that took place. “Thus from a modest $342 billion of deals in 
1992, the worldwide volume of mergers marched steadily upward to $3.3 trillion 
worldwide in 2000.”61 Nine of the ten largest deals in history all took place in the three-
year period from 1998-2000, with the tenth in 2006 (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 14.   Top Ten Deals Worldwide(From62) 
The year 2000 started with the announcement of the record-setting $165 
billion merger of Time Warner and AOL. However, after a five-year burst of 
telecommunications, media and technology (TMT) mergers, there was a dramatic slow 
down in the TMT sector, as well as in all mergers. It started with the collapse of the 
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Internet stocks at the end of the first quarter and was followed by the earnings and 
financing problems of telecommunications. “Following the bursting of the Internet 
bubble in March 2000, M&A activity declined sharply” 63, signaling the end of the fifth 
wave, “in tandem with the stock market and the U.S. economy and in conjunction with 
the rise of global and security concerns.” 64 
C. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
The legislative framework that governs corporate mergers and acquisitions is 
extensive and covers many different aspects. For the purposes of the consolidation of the 
U.S. defense industry and its potential relationship with the cost growth of weapon 
systems, it is more relevant to focus on the antitrust part of the statutory framework and 
how this is generally conceived and interpreted. In addition, its actual implementation in 
relation with the proposed defense industry mergers and acquisitions can offer some 
useful insights, especially in terms of the evolution of governmental policies over time, 
for defense industrial base restructuring.  
2. Legislation and Antitrust Issues 
a. The Basic Elements of the Antitrust Legal Framework 
The main purpose of the antitrust legislative and regulatory framework is 
to protect the competition in a market. More specifically, mergers and acquisitions are 
regulated in an effort by the government to preserve a healthy dynamic market, where the 
benefits of competition, such as affordable prices, high quality and efficient production, 
are available to the buyers.65 It is easy to understand that the importance and the impacts 
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of the antitrust legislation extend far beyond the defense industry, or any particular 
industry; it can affect the whole market and thus the economy, as well as the welfare of 
the buyers, regardless if they are individual consumers, corporations or the government. 
The discussion of the antitrust law extends into many different interrelated areas, 
including politics, economic theory and even history.66 What is more important though, 
for the purposes of this study, is the fact that antitrust legislation has a long history and 
has been continuously adapting and evolving as a regulating mechanism to protect the 
competition, even if the two terms, protection and competition, may appear by definition 
as contradictory. 
b. Sherman Act (1890) 
We can trace the origins of the existing antitrust legislation back to 1890 
with the Sherman Antitrust Act, a historic legislative initiative, arguably intending to cure 
some of the severe difficulties of the agricultural sector at the time.67 This Act 
established the legal barrier against the creation of monopolies and the restraint of trade, 
imposing criminal penalties for such conduct.  Its main goal was to preserve economic 
liberty of the market, and to prevent any attempts to impose restrictions on free trade and 
competition.68 It is worth noting that the first great merger wave, of the period 1897–
1904, did not stop or slow down despite the relatively new statutory measure.69 This can 
be attributed to the fact that the Sherman Act text resembled more of a statement of 
general antitrust and antimonopoly principles than to an easily interpretable and 
applicable legislative document, to facilitate the courts in ruling for business agreements 
whether they were legal or in fact they deteriorated competition and free trade.70  
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Furthermore, the government resources that provided oversight and 
ensured the compliance of business transactions with the antitrust legislation were 
insufficient at the time.71 
c. Clayton Act– Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) 
The Clayton Act was the second attempt of the government to introduce a 
control mechanism against the formation of monopolies that constituted a threat to free 
market and competition. This law was drafted and passed, with the main goal to enhance 
the framework that the Sherman Act had already established. Several issues relating to 
unlawful corporate practices and subsequent financial market turbulences prepared the 
ground for drafting and acceptance of the new legislation.72 The Clayton Act provided a 
more elaborate definition and description of the prohibited practices, maintaining the 
same fundamental principles, but making their enforcement more feasible by the judicial 
authorities.73 This law includes provisions for the prohibition of specific corporate 
practices, among which are: price discrimination between customers, tying contracts, 
acquisition of stock competing firms if this harmed competition, and interlocking 
directorates when the directors or officers belong to companies that are competitors in the 
same market.74 The Clayton Act provided the first specific framework directly applicable 
to mergers and acquisitions, offering a tool to oppose to the formation of monopolies.75  
The Clayton Act was amended with the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 to 
provide for the prohibition of the acquisition of another firm by buying its assets instead 
of its stocks, if the result was harmful for the competition.76 In 1914, the same year the 
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Clayton Act was passed, the government also passed the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
This Act created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) along with other provisions. The 
FTC was established as the agency responsible for the enforcement of the antitrust 
legislation,77 and retains this role still today. The bureau of competition of the FTC is the 
department that performs the antitrust duties and reviews the merger and acquisition 
proposals.78 The antitrust division of the Department of Justice, headed by an Assistant 
Attorney General, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,79 has also 
joint jurisdiction in the enforcement of the antitrust legislation and was created in its 
present form in 1933, with the mission to promote and maintain competition in the U.S. 
economy.80 
d. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was passed in 1976 and sets the requirements 
for pre-merger notification and review of the proposed merger or acquisition by the FTC 
and the antitrust division of the Department of Justice.81 This law prevents anti-
competitive mergers and acquisitions before they actually take place. It sets provisions 
and thresholds for review that, in combination with Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
constitute the backbone of the antitrust enforcement legal framework. The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act is particularly interesting for the defense industry consolidation, at least for 
the larger scale mergers and acquisitions, since these are filed and reviewed if they meet 
certain requirements set by this statute. The parties that propose to consolidate have to 
submit completed filings, pay the fee and enter into a 30-day waiting period before the 
merger is completed, unless the government chooses to extend this period due to the need 
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for additional information. Some of the basic requirements that determine whether the 
filing for review is needed are the following:82 
• If any of the proposing parties is engaged in commerce or in any 
activity that affects commerce. 
• If the acquiring party, after the acquisition, will have an aggregate 
total of assets of the acquired more than a specified amount 
(adjusted and published, last threshold was $252.3 million). 
• If the acquiring party, after the acquisition, will have an aggregate 
total of assets of the acquired between the adjustable specified 
amounts (last thresholds were $63.1 and $252.3 million). The 
acquiring party has net annual sales or total assets more than the 
specified amount (last adjustment was to $126.2 million), while its 
net annual sales or total assets exceed the specified amount (last 
adjustment was to $12.6 million), if the acquired party is in 
manufacturing, otherwise only the total assets are considered.  
• Other requirements also are included, with adjustable thresholds 
that are published. 
• The statute has a list of exemptions.  
e. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The FTC and the Department of Justice published the joint “Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines” in 1992 (latest version), with amendments in 1997. These Guidelines 
are designed to implement the antitrust legislation in determining whether a merger or 
acquisition acts against the competition in the market.83 These Guidelines are common 
for all types and categories of industries, but they have provisions in order to consider 
their particular characteristics.84 These guidelines are also applied in the case of the 
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defense industry mergers and acquisitions review to decide whether the antitrust agencies 
will rule against a proposed merger and therefore challenge it. 
The Guidelines define five basic assessment steps performed by the 
antitrust agencies to make their determination upon a proposed merger action:85 
• Step 1: Significant increase of concentration resulting in a 
concentrated market. 
• Step 2: Concerns about potential adverse competitive effects.  
• Step 3: Whether entry in the particular market is easy, meaning 
timely, likely and sufficient either to deter or to counteract the 
competitive effects of concern.  
• Step 4:  Efficiency gains will result from the merger that cannot 
reasonably be achieved with other means.  
• Step 5: If, unless the merger takes place, either party to the 
transaction is likely to fail and exit the market. 
f. The Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The antitrust agencies use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as a 







where, n is the number of companies in the specific market and Sharei is the market 
share of the i company (values in the 0 to 100 range).86 In the case of a pure monopoly, 
the HHI has its maximum value of 10,000, while for perfect competition HHI will have 
an approximate value of 0. The antitrust agencies consider three ranges of HHI values 
after the merger, according to which they categorize the market concentration. These 
ranges87 are as follows: 
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• HHI ≤ 1000: Unconcentrated market; the proposed merger is not 
likely to produce negative effects on the competition. 
• 1000 ≤ HHI ≤ 1800: Moderately concentrated market; the decision 
depends on the increase that the merger is estimated to bring in the 
concentration (higher or lower than 100), and on other 
considerations. 
• HHI ≥ 1800: Highly concentrated market, the decision depends on 
the increase that the merger is estimated to bring in the 
concentration (higher or lower than 50), and on other 
considerations. 
It is easy to see that even if the number of the remaining firms in a market 
is smaller after mergers take place, the market concentration as calculated using the HHI 
may produce different results.  
3. What Did Really Happen After All? 
For the period of 1982-1992, which is before the consolidation wave in the 
defense industry and the reduction in defense procurement expenditures, an increase in 
the HHI took place for aircraft and aircraft engines manufacturing sectors.88  This is an 
indication that an increase in market concentration, at least in some sectors, had already 
begun prior to the consolidation period. This assumption is also found in another study, 
where the market shares were calculated for fixed-wing aircraft and for guided missiles 
sectors based on procurement data for the periods of 1994-1996 and 1996-1998.89 The 
results show that there has not been an increase in market concentration for these two 
sectors. In fact, the HHI was lower in the period of 1996-1998 than from 1994-1996. This 
approach may have some restrictions, using procurement data instead of the value of 
shipments, as the U.S. Census Bureau uses. However, it raises the question whether the 
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decline in the number of the prime contractors after the consolidation wave actually 
represents an increase in the concentration of the market, and whether the concentration 
had already increased before. 
Other points can differentiate the defense industry mergers and acquisitions from 
the commercial market’s similar activity. Specifically, there are views that while defense 
oriented companies have actually performed a high number of consolidation agreements, 
this has remained in the region of financial deals and did not translate into reduction of 
the existing industrial overcapacity90.  From this perspective, the defense industry did not 
follow the normal market approach towards efficiency, in the face of declining demand, 
partially due to exogenous factors and pressures, such as political influence91. 
4. The Role of DOD in the Consolidation of Defense Industry 
a. Introduction 
The DoD decided to assume an active role in promoting, encouraging and 
supporting the consolidation in the U.S. defense industry, even though this strategy also 
brought inherent risks relating to potentially harmful effects to the competition in the 
particular market. More specifically, in 1993, Secretary of Defense William Perry openly 
encouraged consolidation of the defense industry in an effort to reduce overhead due to 
overcapacity that was no longer necessary under the new conditions of reduced defense 
expenditures.92 Subsequently, the Defense Science Board task force published a report in 
1994, which concluded that the antitrust legal framework and the responsible agencies for 
its enforcement were sufficient to cover the issue of defense industry mergers and 
acquisitions, but the DoD should express its views, which should be taken into careful 
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consideration.93 The official DoD policy was revised in 1996 to establish the assessment 
by the DoD of potential implications from mergers and acquisitions of primary defense 
companies and the cooperation with the antitrust agencies.94  
It is interesting that the antitrust review of the proposed mergers and 
acquisitions of defense contractors was not met with consensus. On the contrary, 
opposing views were expressed, among which was the complete exemption of defense 
firms from any antitrust agencies review.95  
b. Restructuring Costs and Savings Issues 
An important tool that the DoD used in order to support the consolidation 
was the allowance of the restructuring costs that resulted from a merger or acquisition. 
This was a strong incentive to promote the consolidation of primary defense contractors. 
A memorandum by Under Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, established this 
allowance for acquisition in July 1993.96 This memorandum provided that these costs 
could be allowable if it could be shown that the projected savings would be higher than 
the costs and that the merger preserved a critical defense capability.97 This approach 
made it possible for defense contractors to charge restructuring costs to cost-
reimbursement type contracts with the DoD, avoiding any obstacles due to the 
interpretation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, thus facilitating the mergers and 
acquisitions processes. The basic prerequisite to justify the restructuring costs allowance 
was that the contractors had to show that significant projected savings would result from 
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the consolidation. The DoD issued regulations regarding the costs of the defense 
contractor firms restructuring, but these regulations were considered by the General 
Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) as inconsistent with the 
requirements set by the legislation, specifically by section 818 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1995.98 The estimation for the anticipated savings from the 
consolidation proved to be a difficult task with considerable uncertainty. In 1998, there 
were still concerns whether the DoD’s estimations for savings were accurate or in fact 
overstated, while it was discovered that the Services’ budget requirements did not include 
these savings as a factor.99  
c. Mergers and Acquisitions Proposals Reviews 
The antitrust analysis of a proposed merger or acquisition is not a simple 
task. Potential anticompetitive consequences have to be identified by the agencies, taking 
into account a multitude of different, and in some cases contradicting, factors. As 
mentioned above, the Defense Science Board in 1994 concluded that the existing 
legislative and regulatory framework provided sufficient means and tools to cope with 
this difficult analysis. Nevertheless, the burden of the decision relied on the antitrust 
agencies, with the DoD to act mainly as an advisor providing information and expertise, 
even though its views were always of primary importance. The participation of DoD in 
the review of the proposed mergers and acquisitions is the basic difference in the antitrust 
analysis between a defense industry case and a general commercial market business 
integration proposal.100 We can reasonably assume that over time, the role of the DoD in 
the proposed mergers and acquisitions reviews became increasingly active; however, the 
legal framework did not change and the antitrust agencies retained their authority and 
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responsibility to decide upon the proposals.101 This kind of cooperation may have 
actually accelerated the merger and acquisition wave in the defense industry, at least until 
1998, the period when the policy of the DoD became more conservative and reluctant 
towards further consolidation.102  
In order to identify possibilities for anticompetitive results, the antitrust 
agencies need to specify what markets are affected by the proposed consolidation action, 
a question not so easily answered due to the complexity of the weapon systems and their 
importance and applications in different types of missions. Apart from the issues related 
to competition, market shares and barriers for potential new entrants in this market, the 
projected efficiencies are another factor to consider, while determining the balance 
between benefits and costs of the merger or acquisition.103 These projected efficiencies 
were one of the primary arguments in supporting the consolidation by different 
parties.104 In cases where the antitrust agencies and the DoD found that there were 
significant possibilities of future problems in DoD programs due to a proposed merger or 
acquisition, the proposing firms had to take certain steps to cure antitrust issues before 
the consolidation got approval, usually to protect proprietary information.105  
Except the cases of horizontal mergers or acquisitions that took place 
during the 1990s, defense companies also performed vertical consolidation actions, when 
higher level contractors acquired companies that were their suppliers. The existing 
mechanism could not provide accurate estimates to the DoD for this phenomenon or its 
possible consequences for competition or other aspects of the defense market, at least 
                                                 
101 DoD, Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, February 2003, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/ind-cap-annual-report-to-congress_2003.pdf (accessed March 2008). 
102 John Deutch, “Consolidation of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,” Acquisition Review Quarterly 
(Fall 2001), http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/2001arq/Deutch.pdf (accessed March 2008). 
103 Pitofsky, prepared statement. 
104 Jerrold T. Lundquist, “Shrinking Fast and Smart,” Harvard Business Review (November-
December 1992).  
105 GAO, Defense Industry Consolidation: Competitive Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (T-
NSIAD-98-112, March 4, 1998, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, 
Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98112t.pdf (accessed 
April 19, 2008). 
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until 1998, when these difficulties were recognized.106 The antitrust agencies applied the 
same principles in their analysis for vertical integration as for horizontal mergers or 
acquisitions, focusing on the safeguarding of confidential information.107 
The antitrust agencies in the 1990s had to cope with a massive merger 
wave which extended far beyond the defense industry. In 1996 a total of 3,094 proposed 
consolidation transactions were filed under the requirements of the aforementioned Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, a number that constituted a historical top until then.108 The dollar 
value of the mergers from 1992-1998 increased by approximately ten times.109 The 
difficulties are obvious and in some cases the proposals were rejected, but ultimately the 
consolidation prevailed, resulting in a much smaller number of prime contractors in the 
defense industry.110 The DoD continued to support the consolidation as the primary 
strategy to reduce excess capacity and increase efficiency in the defense industry, stating 
that there were no indications that competition faced negative consequences and that the 
actions by the DoD and the antitrust agencies were successful and sufficient.111  
However, from 1998 and with the merger wave still ongoing, significant concerns began 
to emerge from various parties and analysts as to whether the consolidation of the U.S. 
defense industrial base had gone too far, potentially affecting future competition and 
weapon systems cost for the DoD.112  
                                                 
106 GAO, Defense Industry Consolidation. 
107 Pitofsky, prepared statement. 
108 Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, (statement 
before the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary U.S. 
Senate, February 26, 1998), http://0225.0145.01.040/atr/public/testimony/1581.htm (accessed April 19, 
2008). 
109 Klein, (statement before the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, June 16, 1998), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/1795.htm (accessed April 20, 2008). 
110 GAO, Defense Industry Consolidation. 
111 U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on the Effects of Mergers in the Defense Industry, 
March 1997, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA323934&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed March 2008). 
112 Leslie Wayne, “The Shrinking Military Complex; After the Cold War, the Pentagon Is Just 




d. Some Conclusions 
The Government dealt with the merger wave of the defense industry in the 
1990s mostly using the existing legal and regulatory framework, adding the contribution 
of the DoD’s expertise and information, to assist the antitrust agencies. However, the 
general approach was the same with the commercial industry mergers and acquisitions 
reviews. The DoD encouraged and maintained a policy that was favorable to mergers and 
acquisitions, considering the resulting savings and benefits as important and the 
consequences on the competition as of minor significance113. Under this policy, the vast 
majority of the proposed mergers and acquisitions for this period were approved, even 
though in some cases the antitrust agencies required corrective measures before 
proceeding.  
The legal framework that covers the mergers and acquisitions requires 
careful scrutiny of the proposals, but at the same time, it leaves considerable margins for 
different interpretations. It is important to take into account the fact that there was a 
widely adopted view among the different parties about the value that the consolidation 
would eventually bring for all the stakeholders, including the DoD and the taxpayers. We 
already have mentioned that DoD officially followed this policy, but at the same time, 
several analysts shared the same views and had high expectations from the capacity 
reduction and subsequent efficiencies. Furthermore, defense industry executives at the 
highest level, largely agreed with this approach, summarizing the policy measures that 
they believed as the most appropriate and effective in: reduction of excess capacity, 
increase of the exports of weapon systems and development of technologically advanced 
products114. This situation created a climate favorable to the consolidation, possibly 
contributing to the approval of merger and acquisition proposals by the antitrust agencies. 
                                                 
113 DOD, Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, January 2001 (http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA386142&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed in March 2008) 
114 Statement of Norman R. Augustine, President,  Lockheed Martin Corporation, Before the Federal 
Trade Commission Hearing on the Changing Nature of Competition in a Global and Innovation-Driven 
Age, Nv. 2, 1995 (http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/augustin.shtm, accessed on 04/19/2008) 
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The legal framework remains the same until today, and the DoD plays an 
active role in reviewing the proposed mergers and acquisitions, in cooperation with the 
antitrust agencies, with an emphasis in the prevention of anticompetitive results115. 
D. TOP FIVE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONTRACTORS 
As described in a previous section, the 1990s and the ongoing fifth merger wave 
were a period of mega-transactions that also affected the defense industry. In addition to 
the market’s trend of intense M&A activity, the message of Defense Secretary Les Aspin 
and Deputy Secretary William Perry, at the now famous “Last Supper,” was clear: 
“consolidate or evaporate.” Thus, the reaction was almost imminent and the consequent 
result was a significant reduction in the number of prime contractors in ten of the twelve 
markets, which the DOD identified as important to national security116. From Table 9 
below (first published in a GAO report on April 30, 1998) it is obvious that the end of the 
massive consolidation period created five enormous companies dominating almost every 
sector of the defense industry. The largest number of reductions has been in the tactical 
missile, fixed-wing aircraft, and expendable launch vehicle markets. For example, the 
number of contractors producing tactical missiles dropped from thirteen to four. Only two 
contractors now compete in such key defense markets as expendable launch vehicles, 
tracked combat vehicles, strategic missiles, and torpedoes. 
Sector 
Reduction in 
contractors 1990 contractors 1998 contractors 















                                                 
115 DOD, Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, February 2007 available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congress-2007.pdf, (accessed on 04/20/2008) 
116 GAO, Defense Industry Restructuring: Updated Cost and Savings Information (NSIAD-98-156, 
April 30, 1998), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98156.pdf (accessed April 20, 1998). Note: 
submarines and ammunition are not included since these sectors did not experience any changes. The 






































Loral Space Systems 
TRW 
 
Surface ships 8 to 5 Avondale 

























Stewart & Stevenson 
Tracked combat 
vehicles 


























Table 9.   Prime Contractors in Defense Markets Sectors (1990-98) (From117) 
A brief comparative analysis of data included in the DoD report named “100 
Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards,” which is 
published annually will provide sufficient evidence for the volume of contracts awarded 
to the prime contractors. Data in this report reflect the net value of both debit and credit 
procurement actions over $25,000. The scope of this brief analysis is to identify what 
proportion of deals the remaining five huge contractors (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman) receive yearly from the 
procurement expenditures of the DoD. This report contains summary data on the 100 
companies, including their subsidiaries, which were awarded the largest total dollar 
volume of Department of Defense prime contract awards during each fiscal year118. 
Table 10 and figure 15 was constructed from the data collected from this report for the 
fiscal years 1993 until 2006119.  
From the total amount, DOD appropriates in contracts among the different 
categories of procurement on average 61.15% of it is awarded to the Top 100 companies 
and their subsidiaries. At the beginning of the fifth merger wave (FY1993) which 
strongly affected the defense industry, the contemporary top 5 contractors were given the 
                                                 
117 Reproduced from General Accounting Office, Defense Industry Restructuring: Updated Cost and 
Savings Information NSIAD-98-156  April 30, 1998 available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98156.pdf, (accessed on 04/20/1998). Note: Submarines and 
ammunition are not included since these sectors did not experience any changes. The electronics sector is 
not included. 
118 General Accounting Office, Defense Industry Restructuring: Updated Cost and Savings 
Information NSIAD-98-156  April 30, 1998 available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98156.pdf, 
(accessed on 04/20/1998). Note: Submarines and ammunition are not included since these sectors did not 
experience any changes. The electronics sector is not included. 
119 The report for FY2006 was the last one available online when the web site was accessed (May 
2008) at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/historical_reports/statistics/procstat.html. 
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13.68% of the total awards. This percentage started steadily to increase as each of the 
“merger of equals” took place (Northrop Corp. and Grumman Corp in 1994, Lockheed 
and Martin Marietta in 1995, Boeing and Mc Donnel in 1997). At the end of the merger 















1993 61.52 5.58 2.61 2.42 1.34 1.73 
1994 61.89 5.51 2.31 4.40 1.01 2.37 
1995 58.86 8.91 2.45 2.47 1.51 1.44 
1996 58.43 10.03 2.51 2.17 1.44 2.23 
1997 58.18 9.97 2.45 2.97 8.26 2.58 
1998 60.09 10.44 4.79 2.27 9.19 3.11 
1999 60.33 10.13 5.11 2.27 9.25 3.64 
2000 61.95 11.35 4.75 2.31 9.03 2.31 
2001 62.79 10.15 3.85 3.56 9.22 3.39 
2002 62.78 9.95 4.10 5.11 9.65 4.08 
2003 64.04 10.49 3.79 5.32 8.30 3.94 
2004 63.62 8.97 3.47 5.16 7.40 4.15 
2005 60.60 7.22 3.38 5.02 6.80 3.95 
2006 61.07 9.02 3.41 5.64 6.88 3.41 
Table 10.   Percentage of Total Procurement Prime Actions (above $25,000) (After120) 
Since 1999, the ranking of the “Top 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar 
Volume of Prime Contract Awards” shows little changes with Raytheon, General 
Dynamics and Northrop Grumman fighting for the third, fourth and fifth place, 
respectively. The first two were firmly occupied from Lockheed Martin and Boeing. 
Every fiscal year the top five companies are awarded with almost half of the amount of 
procurement actions that the top one hundred companies share. 
                                                 
120 Constructed from the authors using data from DOD report named “100 Companies Receiving the 
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards,” for the years 1993 until 2006 available online at the 
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Figure 15.   Distribution of Prime Contracts Awards (After121) 
The consolidation diagrams presented in Figures 21 through 25 at the end of this 
chapter provides the reader with an idea about the intensity of M&A transactions that 
occurred in the defense industry during the fifth merger wave and altered the picture of 
the market. 
                                                 
121 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
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1. The Boeing Company 
The Boeing Company is the leading company in both global aerospace and the 
defense market, with a 9.3% share of the market; and in the United States market, with an 
11.7% share of the market by value.122 As shown in Figure 16, Boeing seems to have 
gained the most from the defense consolidation period. Before the merger with the 
McDonnel–Douglas in 1997 it was rarely ranked among the ten first contractors of the 
U.S. defense market. During the years that the majority of mergers in the defense 
industry took place, the rate of increase to the proportion of contracts awarded to the 
company was very high. Hence, since 1998 she has been awarded an average of 8.60% of 
prime procurement contracts, a percentage that ranks Boeing almost permanently in 
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Figure 16.   Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Boeing (After123) 
                                                 
122 Datamonitor. “Global Airspace & Defense: Industry Profile,” (January 2008), 
www.datamonitor.com (accessed April 17, 2008). 
123 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
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2. Lockheed Martin 
Lockheed Martin Corporation occupies the second place in the global aerospace 
and defense market, with a 6.0% share of the market’s value and the second place in the 
U.S. aerospace and defense market with a share of 10.5%124. In the top one hundred list 
of companies with the procurement prime awards, it constantly holds first place. The 
proportion of contracts awarded was increased after the consolidation with Martin 
Marietta Corporation. From that point on, Lockheed Martin accounts for an average of 
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Figure 17.   Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Lockheed Martin (After125) 
                                                 
124 Datamonitor. “Global Airspace & Defense: Industry Profile.”  
125 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
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3. Northrop Grumman 
In comparison to the top two giants of the industry, Northrop Grumman 
Corporation occupies the third place in the U.S. aerospace and defense market, 
accounting for a share of 10.5% of the market's value. The percentage of the total 
procurement spending that is awarded to the company almost doubled after the intense 
M&A activity of the 1990s, now reaching the level of 5% of the total amount, with an 
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Figure 18.   Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Northrop Grumman (After126) 
                                                 
126 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
60 
4. General Dynamics 
The percentage of total procurement, which is yearly awarded to General 
Dynamics, has shown a significant increase over the years of consolidation. The company 
is now occupying the fourth place in the ranking “Top 100 Companies Receiving the 
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards,” accounting for an average 3.02% of 
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Figure 19.   Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to General Dynamics (After127) 
                                                 
127 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
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5. Raytheon 
Last but not least among the five top contractors, Raytheon holds the fifth place in 
the ranking of the “Top 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime 
Contract Awards,” accounting for an average of 3.50% of the total amount spent on 
procurement as depicted in Figure 20. For Raytheon the proportion of contracts awarded 
has increased as an effect of the defense industry consolidation but at a lower rate than 









1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Raytheon Co.
 
Figure 20.   Percentage of Total Procurement awarded to Raytheon(After128) 
                                                 
128 Developed from the authors using data available at the report named “100 Companies Receiving 
the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards” which is published annually and is available online 
at dtic.net. The data are also available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) web site of 
the DoD at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ (assessed April 2008). 
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Figure 21.   The Boeing Company Consolidation Diagram(From129)
                                                 
129  Sources DM&A, Washington Technology, various company reports and analysis by CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group. 
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Figure 22.   Lockheed Martin Corp. Consolidation Diagram(From130)
                                                 




Figure 23.   General Dynamics Corp. Consolidation Diagram(From131)
                                                 




Figure 24.   Northrop Grumman Corp. Consolidation Diagram (From132)
                                                 
132  Sources DM&A, Washington Technology, various company reports and analysis by CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group. 
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Figure 25.   Raytheon Company Consolidation Diagram (From133)
                                                 




Cost estimation and different ways to measure and report it, is a major issue in 
every organization dealing with acquisition of systems and program management. DoD 
Instruction 5000.1 is the fundamental acquisition policy document that sets the 
framework of acquisition and program management within the military environment and 
provides useful details about procedures which should be followed during the life cycle 
of each program. In addition, DoD Instruction 5000.2 provides details for the operation of 
defense acquisition system and lists the type and number of records and reports required 
to assure that everyone involved directly or indirectly to the project management of 
system has access to adequate information about the evolution of the program and can 
participate in the respective decision making process. One of the mandatory requirements 
for each one of the major defense acquisition programs is the almost quarterly submission 
of cost estimations and possible changes through the SARs. The purpose of the SAR is to 
inform the associated committees of the Congress and the Senate about the evolution of 
MDAP and consequences on the appropriated budget for each program. This analysis is 
solely based on cost data derived from selected acquisition reports submitted after 1980, 
although SAR cost information is available for hundreds of programs dating back to 
December 1969. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the period of intense 
M&A activity of the 1990s in the defense industry has affected the cost of weapon 
systems. Therefore, the analysis of systems’ cost data before the 1980s is considered 
beyond the scope of this survey. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES 
The data that were used to calculate cost growth of the examined MDAPs are 
derived from a database developed in a previous analysis on the same field of defense 
industry consolidation. That database is a result of the collection of SAR submittals of 
weapons systems since 1980. However, the large amount of information of the accessible 
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database rendered mandatory the adoption of an additional number of criteria in order to 
facilitate the analysis. The majority of assumptions made and guidelines are thoroughly 
presented below: 
• Defense industry consolidation that took place from 1993 until 1998 
resulted in the formation of mainly top five defense contractors that 
dominate the market. A previous chapter presented that the proportion of 
prime defense contracts awarded to the top five contractors reaches 30% 
of the total amount spent on procurement, when at the same time the top 
100 contractors absorb 60% of it. Thus, only the programs of Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics and Raytheon 
are examined throughout this analysis, as it is assumed that any possible 
trends concerning cost growth of systems will be reflected to the top 
contractors programs. 
• In order to identify differences and possible trends and summarize 
conclusions all the examined programs were divided into three broad 
categories, mainly from the submittal dates of the SARs in which they 
were reported. Hence, the fist category incorporates programs that were 
completed in the years before the start of consolidation; that is, before 
1993. The second category includes programs that started after the end of 
the period of interest (after 1997). The last one contains all those programs 
whose reporting cycle in the SARs includes the years of intense merger 
activity (1993 until 1997) and therefore are examined separately. 
• One of the most important entries in every report for every program is the 
baseline year. This date is essential as it provides information about the 
beginning and reference year of cost estimation. For long lasting programs 
that appear in the SARs for decades, it is a common for cost estimators to 
reconfigure the baseline year for a program. Although there is strong 
belief that when in the course of reports of a program there is a change in 
the baseline year, the rest of the program for cost estimation should be 
considered as a new program; in this analysis we neglect this belief. As 
will be described in a later section, cost growth is being calculated as a 
ratio of cost estimates and therefore inflation factors are eliminated; hence, 
the series of numbers (cost estimates) for a program are taken all into 
consideration even if there was a change in baseline year. 
• As was presented in a previous chapter, the official metric to quantify the 
degree of competitiveness in a specific industry is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI). The antitrust authorities are also using this index 
as a criterion for the approval of a proposed merger or acquisition. The 
official source that provides the values for the HHI for the different 
industries is the U.S. Census Bureau. Every different industry is tagged 
with a number according to the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS). This NAICS number has replaced the older U.S. 
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Since the NAICS number 
for each program was available in the database from where cost data were 
extracted, the results of the statistical analysis were also sorted by NAICS 
in an effort to directly relate the officially calculated degree of 
concentration in the industry, as expressed by the HHI, with the programs’ 
cost growth.   
• Each of the selected programs provided a set of numbers reflecting the 
fluctuation of the cost growth index of the respective program. The 
method to calculate cost growth is described analytically in a later 
paragraph. The average of these series of numbers resulted in the average 
cost growth for each system, which was the number used for further 
analysis. 
After examining the available database through the perspective formed from the 
criteria listed above, from almost 358 programs, 113 programs were analyzed and the 
geometric average of cost growth was calculated. 
C. COST GROWTH CALCULATIONS 
It is very important to note that the information that the SAR reports include are 
not intended to serve as a basis for statistical analysis. The relevant literature mentions 
several limitations for the use of the data of SAR reports for the calculation of cost 
growth and attempts to deal with these limitations in different ways. However, the cost 
growth of weapon systems programs can still be useful to provide some quantitative 
assessments for the related issues. The limitations that exist have not prevented several 
studies for the programs cost growth, due to the insights that they can offer, in terms of 
the overall issue of the cost of weapon systems that the DoD procures.  
Due to the limitations of cost growth, this metric has to be combined with other 
relevant information and views in order to draw any conclusions. Even with this 
combination, the conclusions are inherently risky in terms of the actual causes and effects 
related to the cost of weapon systems. Nevertheless, useful indications can emerge from 
this kind of analysis.  
In the existing literature, the definition of cost growth can be seen either as the 
ratio of a current cost estimate to a previous cost estimate of the same system in the past, 
and alternatively as the difference between the most recent or final estimate and the initial 
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one. In this analysis, cost growth was calculated for every one of the selected systems as 
the ratio of the current cost estimate (in base year dollars) to the baseline cost estimate 
(again in base year dollars). In this approach a time series of numbers, each one reflecting 
at the specific SAR from which data were derived, was produced for each program. This 
method was selected as it offered the advantage to eliminate problems caused from 
inflation factors because it compares amounts of money of the same year (baseline year). 
Thus, any change in baseline year seemed to have minor effects on the calculated 
numbers as it affected not only current year estimates but baseline estimates as well. 
Additionally, in order to account for changes in cost growth due to changes made in the 
quantities of the respective weapon systems, a calculation of unit cost growth was 
applied. The following table is a representative sample of the database information used 
to calculate unit cost growth. 
 
Baseline Estimate Current Estimate Weapon 
System 
Base 








C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2002 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8480.8 10269.7 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2002 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8480.8 10269.7 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2002 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8554.7 10257.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2003 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8554.7 10257.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2003 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8554.7 10257.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2003 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8463.2 10192.3 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2004 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8463.2 10192.3 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2004 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8463.2 10192.3 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2004 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8639.7 11046.8 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2005 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8639.7 11046.8 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2005 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8639.7 11046.8 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2005 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8494.1 11054.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2006 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8494.1 11054.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2006 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8494.1 11054.1 112 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2006 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 12983.7 17506.2 111 
C-5 RERP 2000 6/30/2007 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 12983.7 17506.2 111 
C-5 RERP 2000 9/30/2007 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 12983.7 17506.2 111 
C-5 RERP 2000 12/31/2007 Air Force 8798 11093.9 126 8478 11130.9 111 
Table 11.   Database Table Example used for Unit Cost Growth Calculation  
The data contained in the shaded columns were used for the calculation. The 
formula that was applied is presented below: 
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Current Estimate
Current QuantityUnit Cost Growth Baseline Estimate
Baseline Quantity
= . 
All amounts are expressed in baseline year dollars. 
The same calculation is repeated for as many entries (different SARs) that exist in 
the database. The outcome is a series of numbers, the geometric average of which is 
calculated, and represents the mean Unit Cost Growth for the examined weapon system. 
The geometric mean was used for two reasons: first, to extract a single value of the 
examined metric for each weapon system; and second, because it is more appropriate as a 
measure, when working with percentages, rather than the true values, as was the case in 
this study. The formula to calculate the geometric mean is the following: 
1 2Geometric Mean ...n nCG CG CG= × × . 
The function of MS Excel to calculate the geometric mean was used. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
After calculating the values of cost growth for the selected weapon systems 
programs, a basic statistical analysis was performed. Specifically, the descriptive 
statistics function of the data analysis add-in feature for MS Excel was applied. The 
results are included and discussed in the next chapter. Following the initial analysis, data 
were sorted according to the NAICS number in an effort to relate the examined weapons 
system and its cost growth with the available values of the HHI.  
It is important to note that the U.S. Census Bureau has values for HHI for five-
year-long periods. Therefore, the amount of HHI data is limited, posing restrictions for 
detailed quantitative analysis and formulation of models.  
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IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Using the methodology previously described in chapter III, this chapter presents 
the descriptive analysis findings. First, a basic analysis is presented including findings of 
the distribution of values of cost growth of all programs and then the distribution among 
formatted time categories. Second, a narrative presentation is made using available data 
for the NAICS categories in which the selected programs belong. 
B. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
1. All Programs 
As described in the previous chapter, the selected programs of the top five 
contractors were distributed in the three time periods of interest. The findings are 









 (T<1993) (1993< T < 1997) (T> 1997) Total 
Boeing 9 6 12 27 
Lockheed Martin 7 12 10 29 
Northrop Grumman 0 5 9 14 
General Dynamics 13 5 5 23 
Raytheon 4 9 7 20 
Total 33 37 43 113 
Table 12.   Distribution of systems examined among different categories 
 
The application of descriptive statistics for the cost growth values, gave the 




 All Systems Before 1993 Including After1997 
Mean 1.145525536 1.154832227 1.179712001 1.10896693
Standard Error 0.027057106 0.05476323 0.053245167 0.035048468
Median 1.078556918 1.083243668 1.107108068 1.063693154
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Standard Deviation 0.287620982 0.314590807 0.32387771 0.229828172
Sample Variance 0.082725829 0.098967376 0.104896771 0.052820989
Kurtosis 3.833400928 -0.054044667 6.658460884 1.314996604
Skewness 1.411080642 0.679946793 2.243011216 0.474355287
Range 1.924584961 1.286938826 1.720389139 1.199455172
Minimum 0.560927175 0.605432518 0.765122997 0.560927175
Maximum 2.485512135 1.892371344 2.485512135 1.760382346
Sum 129.4443855 38.1094635 43.64934403 47.685578
Count 113 33 37 43
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Figure 26.   Distribution of examined systems Cost Growth (All Selected Programs) 
 
Cost Growth Interval Values All Programs 
0.4 – 0.8 5.31% 
0.8 – 1.2 63.72% 
1.2 – 1.6  23.01% 
Above 1.6  7.96% 
Table 14.   Distribution of Cost Growth Values 
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2. Programs Before Consolidation (prior 1993) 
The calculated values of cost growth for programs before the consolidation period 
are presented in Table 15 and Figure 27: 
 
 NAICS Weapon System Manufacturer Calculated Cost Growth 
1 332993 Avenger (FAADS LOS-R) Boeing 1.118764366 
2 336411 CH-47D Boeing 1.22094507 
3 336411 CSLR Boeing 0.817965126 
4 336411 EA-6 Boeing 0.883443068 
5 336414 IUS Boeing 1.544952871 
6 336411 KC-135R Boeing 0.758522008 
7 336414 PeaceKeeper Boeing 1.195323666 
8 336414 Sea Lance Boeing 1.083243668 
9 336414 SRAM-II Boeing 1.060379149 
10 336414 F-16 Lockheed Martin 1.073157728 
11 336611 LSD-41 Lockheed Martin 0.962378972 
12 336611 LSD-41 (CV) Lockheed Martin 0.917673975 
13 336411 P-3C Lockheed Martin 0.987189659 
14 336411 RPV Lockheed Martin 0.889740688 
15 336414 UTDMDSS Lockheed Martin 1.049137522 
16 332993 Trident Lockheed Martin 1.155126096 
17 332993 ACM General Dynamics 1.516407934 
18 336992 Bradley FVS General Dynamics 1.731555969 
19 336411 F-16 General Dynamics 1.049171156 
20 336414 GLCM General Dynamics 1.892371344 
21 336992 M1 Tank  General Dynamics 1.306829889 
22 336611 NSSN General Dynamics 1.042483885 
23 332995 Phallanx CIWS General Dynamics 1.203628042 
24 336611 SSN-21 Seawolf General Dynamics 1.726894956 
25 336611 SSN-688 Los Angeles General Dynamics 1.177606645 
26 336414 Stinger General Dynamics 1.255858439 
27 336414 Stinger RMP General Dynamics 0.605432518 
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28 336414 Tomahawk General Dynamics 0.84876667 
29 332993 Trident II SUB General Dynamics 0.818640741 
30 336414 Sparrow AIM-7M Raytheon 1.317064876 
31 336411 Tacit Rainbow Raytheon 0.786522893 
32 336414 Sidewinder AIM-9M Navy Raytheon 1.394069216 
33 336414 Sidewinder AIM-9M USAF Raytheon 1.718214694 
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Figure 27.   Distribution of Cost Growths for systems before consolidation 
3. Programs Including Consolidation Period (between 1993 and 1997) 
The calculated values of cost growth for programs during the consolidation period 
are presented in Table 16: 
 
 NAICS Weapon System Manufacturer 
Calculated Cost 
Growth 
1 336411 AV-8 Remanufacture Boeing 1.065977316 
2 336411 C-17A Boeing 1.49031003 
3 334511 E-3RSIP AWACS Boeing 1.124134484 
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4 336411 F/A-18 E/F Boeing 1.062733596 
5 332995 JDAM Boeing 0.883041373 
6 336411 T-45 TS Boeing 1.064106908 
7 332993 ATACAMS-APAM Lockheed Martin 0.986640918 
8 332993 ATACAMS-BAT Lockheed Martin 1.81356796 
9 334511 ATIRCM/CMWS Lockheed Martin 1.267117068 
10 336411 F-22 Lockheed Martin 1.334273566 
11 332993 JASSM Lockheed Martin 0.765122997 
12 336414 Longbow Hellfire Lockheed Martin 1.146621691 
13 541512 MCS (ATCCS) Lockheed Martin 1.043534325 
14 334220 NAVSTAR GPS Lockheed Martin 0.959162866 
15 334220 SBIRS Lockheed Martin 1.795215248 
16 332993 Trident II MSL (D-5) Lockheed Martin 1.229928839 
17 336414 Titan IV Lockheed Martin 1.252481642 
18 336414 THAAD Lockheed Martin 1.601835841 
19 336611 DDG-51 Northrop Grumman 0.984758614 
20 336411 E-2C Reproduction Northrop Grumman 1.129474529 
21 336411 JSTARS Northrop Grumman 1.177392073 
22 336611 LHD-1 Northrop Grumman 0.88525463 
23 336414 Minuteman III GRP Northrop Grumman 1.133774786 
24 336992 EFV (AAAV) General Dynamics 1.39785463 
25 336611 LPD-17 General Dynamics 1.265046752 
26 336992 M1A2 ABRAMS Upgrade General Dynamics 1.035893266 
27 334511 SSN-21 / AN/BSY-2 General Dynamics 2.485512135 
28 336611 Strategic Sealift General Dynamics 0.923973389 
29 332993 AIM-9X Raytheon 1.009048048 
30 336414 AMRAAM Raytheon 1.159309474 
31 334511 CEC Raytheon 1.034414335 
32 332993 JSOW (AIWS) Raytheon 0.954242059 
33 334511 NAS Raytheon 0.955638828 
34 334220 NESP Raytheon 0.89278149 
35 336414 Patriot Pac-3 Raytheon 1.27462087 
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36 334220 Smart-T Raytheon 0.957439387 
37 336414 STD MSL 2 Raytheon 1.107108068 
Table 16.   Systems Examined including Consolidation period (between 1993 - 1997) 
The distribution of values of calculated cost growth among different intervals is 
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Figure 28.   Distribution of Cost Growths for Systems during Consolidation 
4. Programs After Consolidation Period (after 1997) 
The calculated values of cost growth for programs after the consolidation period 
are presented in Table 17: 
 
 NAICS Weapon System Manufacturer 
Calculated 
Cost Growth 
1 336411 ABL Boeing 1.063693154 
2 334511 C-130 AMP Boeing 1.507778138 
3 336411 CH-47F Boeing 1.405536717 
4 336411 EA-18G Boeing 1.022363591 
5 336414 EELV Boeing 1.423290924 
6 541512 FCS Boeing 1.259994685 
7 334220 JTRS GMR (Cluster 1) Boeing 1.013976414 
8 334220 JTRS NED (Waveform) Boeing 1.503781658 
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9 541512 MPS Boeing 0.964891074 
10 332993 NMD Boeing 1.315894231 
11 336411 P-8 (MMA) Boeing 0.98852256 
12 334220 Wideband Gap Filler Boeing 0.974405811 
13 334220 AEHF Lockheed Martin 1.308484535 
14 336411 C-130J Lockheed Martin 1.168238036 
15 336411 C-5 REPR Lockheed Martin 1.171722084 
16 332995 GMLRS Lockheed Martin 1.0807726 
17 332995 HIMARS Lockheed Martin 1.078556918 
18 336411 JSF (F-35) Lockheed Martin 1.149705409 
19 334220 MUOS Lockheed Martin 0.941377857 
20 332995 MLRS Upgrade Lockheed Martin 0.895321783 
21 332993 PATRIOT / MEADS CAP Lockheed Martin 0.968273865 
22 334511 SSDS Lockheed Martin 0.560927175 
23 336611 ASDS Northrop Grumman 1.212607838 
24 334511 B-2 PMP  Northrop Grumman 0.927693539 
25 336611 CVN-21 (RDT&E) Northrop Grumman 0.976461591 
26 336611 CVN-68  Northrop Grumman 1.142523537 
27 336611 DDG 1000 [DD(X)] Northrop Grumman 1.131351647 
28 336411 E-2 Adv Hawkeye Northrop Grumman 1.034386408 
29 336411 Global Hawk Northrop Grumman 1.760382346 
30 334511 MP RTIP Northrop Grumman 0.898033307 
31 336611 T-AKE Northrop Grumman 1.021927241 
32 334220 JTRS HMS (Cluster 5) General Dynamics 1.015998713 
33 336611 SSGN Ohio Class General Dynamics 0.994806924 
34 336611 SSN-774 Virginia Class General Dynamics 1.333942454 
35 336992 Stryker IAV General Dynamics 1.051664969 
36 334220 WIN-T General Dynamics 1.084515647 
37 332993 BMDS (RDT&E) Raytheon 1.557661977 
38 334511 Cobra Judy Raytheon 1.003073289 
39 332993 Excalibur Raytheon 1.136013602 
40 334220 GBS Raytheon 0.598751564 
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41 332993 Navy Area TBMD Raytheon 1.101677791 
42 336414 SM-6 Raytheon 0.967489495 
43 336414 Tactical Tomahawk Raytheon 0.967104899 
Table 17.   Systems examined After Consolidation period (after 1997) 
The distribution of values of calculated cost growth among different intervals is 
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Figure 29.   Distribution of Cost Growths for Systems After Consolidation 
Despite the fact that the selected programs represent a relatively small sample of 
the total history of the programs that are included in the SAR reports, and therefore the 
estimations or inferring are risky, we can still identify some interesting points in relation 
with the cost growth. The categorization of the results, based on the range of cost growth 
values in Table 18, shows a difference between the periods before and after the defense 
industry consolidation. More specifically, we can observe a higher concentration of 
values within the range of 0.8-1.2 after the consolidation period. The percentage for this 
range is 52.94% for the period before the consolidation, whereas the percentages for the 











 (T<1993) (1993< T < 1997) (T> 1997) 
0.4 – 0.8 8.83% 2.70% 4.55% 
0.8 – 1.2 52.94% 64.86% 70.45% 
1.2 – 1.6  23.53% 21.62% 22.73% 
Above 1.6 11.76% 10.81% 2.27% 
Table 18.   Distribution of Cost Growth Values 
From the descriptive statistics, a reduction in the standard deviation is observed 
for the programs after the period of consolidation, indicating a lower dispersion of values 
in relation with the mean.  
The calculated values of cost growth after the consolidation period tend to 
concentrate in the range of 0.8 – 1.2, having a lower percentage of “extreme” values, 
including those that are below 0.8. After the consolidation, a percentage of 86.36% of 
programs had cost growth values below 1.4, whereas 79.41% of programs before 
consolidation fell into the same range. The most notable difference is identified in the 
range of 0.8-1.2, the percentage of which has significantly increased. In addition, the 
proportion of programs exceeding the value of 1.6 has become very low. In Figure 30 is 
presented a comparative analysis of the distribution of cost growth values among 
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Figure 30.   Comparative Distribution of Cost Growths 
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5. Analysis by NAICS  
The selected programs were categorized by their NAICS number using the 
information provided in the database. The NAICS data were available from the U.S. 
Census Bureau Web Site, but for the purposes of this study, several limitations exist: 
some NAICS categories do not fully correspond with a single SIC code (the previous 
codification system). In addition, for some categories, after 1997, only data for the 
immediate higher-level category were available. For example, there are no data available 
after 1997 for codes numbers 336411 and 336414; instead, only data for 33641 are 
provided. For this reason, it is difficult to accurately describe the trend of the industrial 
concentration for these NAICS categories. Nevertheless, we can make assumptions based 
on the available data. The NAICS categories of the selected programs are listed in Table 
19. 
 
NAICS 1997 DESCRIPTION 
332993 Ammunition (except Small Arms) Manufacturing 
332995 Other Ordnance and Accessories Manufacturing 
334220 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless 
Communications Equipment Manufacturing 
334511 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, and 
Nautical System and Instrument Manufacturing 
336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 
336414 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing 
336611 Ship Building and Repairing  
336992 Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component 
Manufacturing  
541512 Computer Systems Design Services  
Table 19.   NAICS categories for Selected Programs (After134) 
                                                 
134 Data from U.S. Census Bureau website. http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html (accessed 
May 10, 2008). 
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From the values of the HHI, listed in Table 20, a general picture for the degree of 
concentration in some categories of the industry can be derived. More specifically, for 
Shipbuilding and repairing sector (336611), the values for 1987, 1992 and 1997, indicate 
that for the period of the consolidation, there was no increase in concentration. If any 
increase existed, this had started before this period. In addition, there is a very large 




NAICS 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 
332993 1003 988 1529 1,782.90 953.10
332995 1061 1858 1929 1,935.80 2,833.50
334220 - - - 971.9 583.6
334511 - 401 385 1,144.60 1135.9
336411 1358 1686 2717 1,636.90 1,518.40
336414 1578 1220 1570 1,636.90 1,518.40
336611 418 755 878 872.70 2,202.70
336992 - - - 563.30 742.1
Table 20.   HHI Values for NAICS categories for Selected Programs (After135) 
For the aircraft manufacturing industry (336411), we do not have adequate 
information. However, it seems that this category was already highly concentrated in 
1992, before the initiation of the consolidation activity. Furthermore, their higher-level 
category (33641) shows a moderate concentration for 1997 and 2002, but since no 
specific data are available for 336411, no definite conclusion can be drawn. The 
possibility for considerably higher concentration in sector 336411, seems rather low 
because this would mean that the concentration would reach extreme values. Although 
there is a high uncertainty, it seems that the actual concentration in this already highly 
concentrated industrial sector did not change dramatically in the 1990s. The situation for 
the sector of guided missiles and space vehicle manufacturing (336414) is somewhat 
different, with lower concentration values, seemingly smoother and more stable over 
                                                 
135 Data from U.S. Census Bureau website. http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html (accessed 
May 10, 2008). 
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time. For the Other ordnance & accessories manufacturing sector (332995), a high 
concentration had begun before the consolidation period, and remained in high values 
throughout the duration for which data are available, reaching the highest value among all 
the categories of the selected programs in 2002. 
86 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
87 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the end of the Cold War period, the U.S. defense industry underwent a very 
extensive consolidation phase. At the same time, defense spending decreased. The end of 
this period of intensive mergers and acquisitions activity left only a handful of major 
defense contractors in the market. One sensible expected outcome of this consolidation 
was the increase of the efficiency of the defense contractors with subsequent results on 
the costs of weapon systems, ultimately saving money for the government. Thus, the 
federal government had actively supported the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 
defense industry. Nevertheless, several issues were addressed in studies and surveys by 
governmental and non-governmental research institutes and organizations. This analysis 
is by no means all-inclusive and is intended to supplement past and future research in this 
area. From the SAR database, the raw data was organized and analyzed to calculate unit 
cost growths of selected systems (that met our analysis criteria) and to assist in providing 
answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• Is there any obvious impact caused from the consolidation to the cost 
growth of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAP)? 
 
Based on the results that were derived from the information included in the 
available database for the selected programs, an obvious quantitative impact on the cost 
growth of the programs can not be directly observed. This means that a significant 
increase or decrease, at least on a large scale, is not derived. However, in the findings it 
was identified that for the group of the selected programs that took place after the period 
of the intense merger and acquisition activity of the U.S. defense industry, the geometric 
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mean of their cost growth is somewhat less dispersed from the mean, showing a higher 
concentration in the range of 0.8 – 1.2.  
At this point it can not be concluded that the consolidation was actually the sole 
cause, or even a partial cause, for this observation. The size of the sample is not 
sufficiently large, but it includes almost all of the programs for which the top five 
companies were prime contractors. Therefore, the results can be used as an indication to 
direct further research upon this area. 
From a qualitative and descriptive standpoint, we can conclude that after the 
consolidation the results indicate that for the top five contractors, the geometric average 
of the cost growth of the weapon systems acquisition programs generally does not give 
higher values than the period before the consolidation.  
Cost growth is a comparative metric showing the increase of the cost of a program 
after its initiation. Many different factors can affect this increase, including quantity 
changes, program management, technology maturity, etc. Although the SAR reports 
explain the various increases in cost, attributing them to specific categories, the role of 
the industry for cost growth must not be underestimated. Efficiency in the defense 
industry can be transferred in cost savings for the buyers and partially in cost stability for 
the programs.  
One of the primary arguments of those that supported the consolidation was the 
cost reduction for the defense industry by eliminating unnecessary capacity and adding 
flexibility. It would be reasonable to expect some part of the anticipated improvements to 
transform into significant cost savings, or program stability.  
The U.S. defense industry consolidation created a lot of debate, one of the root 
causes for which were concerns regarding the competitive effects. These concerns 
included the possibilities for significant increases in the cost of weapon systems 
acquisition programs due to lack of sufficient competition. These concerns arguably 
contributed to the gradual change of the governmental policy that supported mergers and 
acquisitions towards a more conservative approach, skeptical to further consolidation.  
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The results from the available information do not indicate that for the period after 
the consolidation higher increases in the cost of programs took place. This does not 
necessarily show that the consolidation improved the overall situation, but only that there 
are not any indications for significant increases. This is further supported by the results 
for the programs that took place during this period, which indicate a gradual increase in 
the concentration of the derived values within the range of 0.8-1.2.  
There can be different interpretations of these results. It is possible that if the 
consolidation had not taken place, the geometric average of the cost growth would show 
the same behavior. On the other hand, it would be more reasonable to expect a situation 
with higher increases in cost, based on the problems of this industrial sector and the 
decreased demand after the Cold War. Since the results indicate that, at least, the values 
were kept within reasonable limits, it can be reasonably inferred that after the 
consolidation, cost growth shows a more controlled pattern of behavior. It is possible that 
other factors have contributed to this pattern, such as the acquisition reform efforts. The 
root causes have to be further explored, although this is a complicated issue and absolute 
or definite answers are rather unlikely. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What were the causes that led to U.S. defense industry  
 consolidation? 
The consolidation of the U.S. defense industry was an intense 
phenomenon with many aspects. At its beginning, it was generally attributed to the 
anticipated reduction of the demand for weapon systems and the decline of defense 
expenditures, due to the end of the Cold War and the expected Peace Dividend.  
The available historical information for defense spending clearly indicate 
that periods like the one that followed the Cold War, with decreases in defense spending 
after some years of high defense budgets, are not unique, but similar previous cases exist. 
This directs the analysis towards exploring other potential causes that have, at least, 
contributed to the consolidation.  
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From the historical information and various studies for the merger waves 
in the U.S. industry in general, it can be derived that defense industry mergers and 
acquisitions activity took place within a period of a general merger wave, the fifth wave. 
This fact could be an indication that the defense industry consolidation is not an isolated 
phenomenon, despite the particular characteristics of the specific industrial sector. 
Further research is required to explore the possible connections between the two 
consolidation waves. Nevertheless, to attribute the defense industry consolidation solely 
to the governmental policy of the period is a risky assumption. The support of the 
government for the mergers, by distributing their costs on subsequent government 
contracts and by approving the proposed mergers and acquisitions, seem to have played a 
role in facilitating the mergers and acquisition, but this does not directly lead to the 
conclusion that these were the main causes of the phenomenon. 
b. Are there any identifiable trends of the weapon systems cost 
  growth based on the information, which are included in the 
  Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)? 
From the results that were derived from the available data for the cost of 
weapon systems programs, there are not any indications for existing general trends. This 
means that the majority of the unit cost growth of the selected programs shows a high 
degree of fluctuation instead of a discernible trend, increasing or decreasing. 
Many different diagrams with various combinations (e.g., by company, by 
period, by NAICS, etc.) were tried for the purposes for this study. However, these 
combinations did not reveal any trend. The only significant observation was for a number 
of programs of Boeing, including the period of consolidation, that showed a significant 
increase in cost growth during the program and then stabilization at reasonable levels. 
However, this number of programs is small, so the results were not included.  
  c. Are there any obvious consequences of the consolidation for the 
    U.S. and foreign buyers of U.S. weapon systems? 
For the U.S. and foreign buyers of weapon systems the results for the cost 
growth of weapon systems of the top five defense contractors possibly indicate a 
somewhat increased predictability in terms of the probability that the cost of a system can 
disproportionately increase during the course of a program. Again, this cannot be directly 
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attributed to the consolidation, but overall the situation appears as more beneficial for the 
buyers, especially in terms of budgeting and cost overruns.  
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based upon difficulties confronted for the completion of this study, some useful 
ideas for further research are listed below: 
• Exploit resources and available actual data (DD350) to recalculate 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on procurement dollars. Results 
can be used to relate market concentration with cost growth 
• Extend period of study, at least for major defense contractors, to include 
prior periods. 
• Explore possible metrics to develop time series and perform further 
analysis. 
• Perform in-depth research for defense mergers and acquisitions using 
actual financial information. 
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